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*Laurens CHERCHYE, Thomas DEMUYNCK
and Bram DE ROCK*

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Laurens Cherchye^{a,1,*}, Thomas Demuynck^{a,2}, Bram De Rock^{b,3}

^a*Center for Economic Studies, University of Leuven, E. Sabbelaan 53, B-8500 Kortrijk, Belgium*

^b*ECARES-ECORE, Université de Bruxelles; Avenue F.D. Roosevelt 50, CP 114, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium*

Abstract

We present necessary and sufficient revealed preference conditions to verify whether a finite data set on nonlinear budget sets is consistent with the maximization of a quasi-concave utility function. Our results can be used to test for convexity of the underlying preference relation. We also show that in many settings, our conditions are easy to use in practical applications.

Keywords: quasi-concavity, convex preferences, nonlinear budget sets, revealed preference conditions
JEL: C14, D11

*Corresponding author

Email addresses: Laurens.Cherchye@kuleuven.be (Laurens Cherchye), Thomas.Demuynck@kuleuven.be (Thomas Demuynck), bderock@ulb.ac.be (Bram De Rock)

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Any point where the indifference curves are convex rather than concave cannot be observed in a competitive market. Such points are shrouded in eternal darkness.

Samuelson 1958

1. Introduction

This study follows up on two important papers in the literature on revealed preference theory: Afriat (1967) and, more recently, Forges and Minelli (2009). Both papers look at the testable implications of rational (i.e. utility maximizing) consumption behavior for a finite data set of consumption choices. Specifically, they define testable implications in terms of revealed preference conditions, i.e. necessary and sufficient conditions that the data must satisfy to be rationalizable in terms of utility maximization. These conditions also characterize the properties of utility functions that are consistent with such a data rationalization.

Afriat (1967) considers consumption choices on linear budgets. His main results are summarized in Afriat's theorem, which is probably the single most important result in revealed preference theory. One of the most surprising implications of this theorem is that any finite data set on linear budgets is consistent with the maximization of a locally non-satiated utility function if and only if it is consistent with the maximization of an increasing and concave utility function. As such, it is impossible to reject quasi-concavity without rejecting the assumption of utility maximization. Essentially, this means that convexity of preferences is nontestable in the case of linear budgets.

Forges and Minelli (2009) obtain revealed preference conditions for consistency with utility maximization under general (possibly nonlinear) budget sets. An important consequence of their characterization is that they lose the equivalence between consistency with the maximization of a utility function and consistency with the maximization of a quasi-concave utility function. In other words, the nontestability of quasi-concavity no longer applies under nonlinear budgets. This raises an interesting question: for the general budget sets considered by Forges and Minelli, can we define revealed preference conditions that obtain a convex rationalization (i.e. rationalization by a quasi-concave utility function)?

The current paper fills this gap in the literature: we provide a general account of the revealed preference conditions for convex rationalizations of consumption data on nonlinear budgets. We not only provide a theoretical characterization of convex preferences for finite data sets, but we also define versions of our testable implications that are easy to use in practical applications. In what follows, we motivate the economic relevance of our research question, provide a brief summary of the related literature, and point out our main contributions.

Convex preferences and nonlinear budget sets. Quasi-concavity of the utility function or, equivalently, convexity of the preference relation, corresponds to diminishing marginal rates of substitution: in order to keep utility constant, a consumer is willing to sacrifice less and less of a certain good for fixed increments of another good. Non-convexity of preferences implies that the demand correspondence is discontinuous. However, many results in economics rely on the assumption of (upper hemi-)continuity of the demand correspondence. For example, non-convex preferences lead to a failure of the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics. Next, non-convexities can lead to various kinds of market imperfections. For example, without convexity there need not exist an intersection of supply and demand curves. Further, convex preferences are crucial to define shadow prices, which are often fundamental to the analysis of public goods and externalities in theories of optimal taxation, models of risk and ambiguity aversion, ...

Given this revealed importance of convex preferences in the literature, one may have expected much attention for the testable implications of this assumption. However, the empirical demand literature is surprisingly silent on the issue. Afriat's theorem may provide one explanation. As indicated above, this result implies nontestability of convexity under linear budgets (for finite data sets). Another main explanation is probably the advent of duality theory. Currently, most empirical demand analysis departs from a specification of a cost function defined for linear budget sets, which exists even if the underlying utility function is not quasi-concave. In this manner, quasi-concavity is no longer necessary to make individual demand analysis empirically applicable, at least when budget sets are assumed to be linear.

Importantly, the above cited results only suggest that tests of convexity will be empirically idle in the case of linear budget sets. However, many economic decision situations are characterized by nonlinear budget sets. For example, nonlinear budgets prevail in labor supply settings where differentiated tax systems imply a nonlinear trade-off between leisure and consumption, in intertemporal consumption where different interest rates for borrowing and saving make a nonlinear exchange between current and future consumption, in game theoretic settings where individuals' behavior is mutually interdependent, and in models of household production without constant returns to scale.⁴ These examples directly motivate our research question, i.e. characterize the testable implications of convex rationalizations on nonlinear budget sets.

At this point, it is worth indicating that we also have two other important motivations to explore the testable implications associated with convex preferences. First, as touched upon above, at a theoretical level convex preferences are very useful for establishing duality in consumption. Basically, these duality results exploit separating hyperplane theorems, which require convexity of preferences. Second, and perhaps even more importantly, at an empirical level, if we maintain the assumption of convex preferences (because we cannot reject it), then we can conduct a more powerful analysis. For example, exploiting convexity of preferences can result in more precise forecasts of consumption behavior in new situations characterized by unobserved (nonlinear) budget sets. In this respect, our following analysis will also present practical tests of convex preferences, which effectively provide a direct basis for subsequent forecasting/counterfactual analysis.⁵

Revealed preference conditions for nonlinear budgets. This paper fits in the literature on revealed preference tests for consumption behavior to be rationalizable by utility maximization under nonlinear budgets. In what follows we provide a brief account of some main results in this literature that are directly relevant for the current study. This will help us to subsequently indicate our own contributions.

Matzkin (1991) considers two extensions of Afriat's theorem to nonlinear budget sets. The first extension assumes that every budget set is co-convex (i.e. the complement of a convex set). Matzkin shows that the usual revealed preference conditions remain necessary and sufficient for the existence of a concave utility function that rationalizes the data.⁶ The second extension assumes that every budget set has a unique supporting hyperplane through the chosen bundle that contains the whole budget. Matzkin demonstrated that, if we replace the budget set by the half space defined by this hyperplane, the data set is rationalizable by a concave utility function if and only if the usual revealed preference conditions are

⁴See Forges and Minelli (2009) for examples of game theoretic settings involving nonlinear budgets, and Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) for other examples of decision situations characterized by nonlinear budgets.

⁵See, for example, Varian (1982) for an extensive discussion on empirical forecasting/counterfactual analysis starting from revealed preference conditions in the context of consumer behavior (under linear budgets). This discussion is directly translated to our setting (with nonlinear budgets).

⁶Actually, Matzkin (1991) focused on rationalizability by a strict concave utility function (see also Matzkin and Richter (1991)). However, Matzkin's results are easily amendable to rationalizability by a (possibly non-strict) concave utility function.

satisfied for these new ‘virtual’ (linear) budget sets. Interestingly, at the end of Section 3 we show that Matzkin’s results are specific instances of our main result.

Forges and Minelli (2009) also considered data rationalization by a concave utility function in their setting with general budget sets (see also Section 2). Essentially, they showed that their revealed preference conditions guarantee the existence of a (quasi-)concave utility function (only) in a special case that corresponds to Matzkin (1991)’s second extension discussed above.⁷ As such, we extend these authors’ results by establishing testable conditions for convexity that also apply to budgets beyond this special case.

Further, Yatchew (1985) considers the case of rationalizability by a concave utility function when the budget set can be written as a finite union of polyhedral convex sets. He obtains a set of inequalities that are necessary and sufficient for consistency with a concave utility function. Unfortunately, these inequalities are difficult to use in practice because they are quadratic in unknowns and therefore not easily verifiable. At the end of Section 4, we will discuss in more detail the differences between Yatchew’s results and our own results. In particular, we will indicate that we obtain tests that are linear in the unknowns.

As a final note, we indicate that a number of authors have looked at the problem of rationalizability by convex preferences in a more general choice theoretic setting, which is to be distinguished from the consumption setting (with nonlinear budget sets) on which we focus here. For example, Richter and Wong (2004) obtain testable restrictions such that a given preference relation over a finite set of bundles can be represented by a (strict) concave utility function, and Demuyneck (2009) derives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a convex preference relation in a general choice setting.

Our contributions. Our main result provides a full analogue of Afriat’s original theorem for the case of general budgets (assumed to be closed and monotone; see Section 2). By generalizing Afriat’s theorem, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a finite set of budgets and consumption bundles to be consistent with the maximization of a convex preference relation. Interestingly, these conditions turn out to be stronger than the ones that guarantee consistency with a utility function that is not necessarily quasi-concave, which directly implies that the property of convexity is separately testable if budgets are nonlinear.

In its most well known form, Afriat’s theorem shows the equivalence between four consistency conditions for a given set of consumption data with linear budget sets: (i) consistency with the maximization of a utility function, (ii) consistency with a combinatorial condition known as GARP (generalized axiom of revealed preferences), (iii) feasibility of a set of linear inequalities, known as Afriat inequalities, and (iv) consistency with the maximization of a concave utility function. In Section 3, we provide our analogue of Afriat’s theorem by showing equivalence between the following consistency conditions for data characterized by general (possibly nonlinear) budget sets: (i) consistency with the maximization of a quasi-concave utility function, (ii) consistency with a combinatorial condition that reduces to the standard GARP condition in the case of linear budgets, (iii) consistency with a set of linear inequalities that again reduce to the usual Afriat inequalities under linear budgets, and (iv) data consistency with the maximization of a concave utility function. At this point, it is worth remarking that the equivalence between (i) and (iv) actually implies that any data set rationalizable by a quasi-concave utility function

⁷One notable difference between the results in Forges and Minelli (2009) and Matzkin (1991) is that Matzkin only gives a characterization in terms of a GARP condition while Forges and Minelli also provide an equivalent characterization in terms of Afriat inequalities (see Section 2 for formal introductions of the concepts GARP and Afriat inequalities). When we show that Matzkin’s characterization is a special case of our general characterization (at the end of Section 3), we also directly obtain an equivalent characterization in terms of Afriat inequalities (as in Forges and Minelli).

is also rationalizable by a concave utility function. Thus, as a side-product, we show that concavity and quasi-concavity are empirically indistinguishable even in the case of nonlinear budget sets.

In what follows, we will also show that our main result generalizes the existing results in the literature (cited above). Finally, we will indicate that our testable implications may be implemented through simple linear programming techniques. This enables an easy operationalization of our conditions, which is particularly useful in view of practical applications.

Outline. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the stage by introducing Afriat's theorem (for linear budget sets) and the rationalizability result of Forges and Minelli (2009) (for nonlinear budget sets). Here, we show that Afriat's equivalence result breaks down in the case of nonlinear budgets. Section 3 then contains our main result, i.e. the analogue of Afriat's theorem for nonlinear budget sets. We also show that this result encompasses Matzkin (1991)'s results as special cases. Section 4 considers practical operationalizations of our testable conditions for convex rationalizations, and we relate this discussion to the study of Yatchew (1985). Section 5 concludes. The Appendix contains the proofs of our main results.

2. Afriat's theorem and testability of convexity

In this section, we first introduce some useful notation and definitions. We then present Afriat's theorem. As indicated above, a main implication of this result is that convexity of preferences (or quasi-concavity of a rationalizing utility function) is nontestable under linear budget sets. Subsequently, we discuss the main theorem of Forges and Minelli (2009) and show that Afriat's nontestability result does not extend to nonlinear budget sets, which motivates our research question in Section 3.

2.1. Notation and definitions

A *data set* $S = \{B_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}_{t \in T}$ consists of a finite collection of subsets B_t of \mathbb{R}_+^n and elements $\mathbf{x}_t \in B_t$. The intuition is that B_t is a budget set, which contains all feasible consumption bundles of n goods at observation $t \in T$, while \mathbf{x}_t is the chosen consumption bundle from this set. We call (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) an *observation*.

We impose two assumptions on any budget set B_t . First of all, we require that B_t is *closed*. In other words, all limits of sequences of bundles in B_t are also in B_t . This is a technical but generally uncontroversial assumption. Second, we assume that the sets B_t are *monotone*. Formally, this implies for all $\mathbf{x} \in B_t$ and all $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$, if

$$\mathbf{y} \leq \mathbf{x} \Rightarrow \mathbf{y} \in B_t.$$

Intuitively, this condition states that, when an individual can afford the bundle \mathbf{x} , then she can also afford any bundle $\mathbf{y} \leq \mathbf{x}$.⁸ This assumption is satisfied if we assume that an individual can costlessly dispose of any amount of goods, i.e. \mathbf{y} can be obtained by choosing \mathbf{x} and throwing away the bundle $\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{y}$. As a final note, we want to stress that we do not require our budget sets to be compact. As such, it is possible that budget sets are unbounded in some direction.

A bundle $\mathbf{x} \in B_t$ is on the *boundary* ∂B_t of B_t if there is no other bundle \mathbf{y} in B_t that contains more of every good than the bundle \mathbf{x} . Formally,

$$\partial B_t = \{\mathbf{x} \in B_t \mid \forall \mathbf{y} \gg \mathbf{x} : \mathbf{y} \notin B_t\}.$$

⁸For two elements $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$ we have that $\mathbf{x} \leq \mathbf{y}$ if $x_i \leq y_i$ for each good $i \leq n$, we have that $\mathbf{x} < \mathbf{y}$ if $\mathbf{x} \leq \mathbf{y}$ and $\mathbf{x} \neq \mathbf{y}$ and we write $\mathbf{x} \ll \mathbf{y}$ if $x_i < y_i$ for all goods i .

A budget set B_t is *linear* if there exists a price vector $\mathbf{p}_t \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^n$ and a budget $m_t \in \mathbb{R}_+$ such that B_t contains bundles \mathbf{x} of which the expenditure at prices \mathbf{p}_t does not exceed m_t . Formally,

$$B_t = \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid \mathbf{p}_t \mathbf{x} \leq m_t\}.$$

Observe that, for linear budget sets, the boundary of B_t coincides with the budget hyperplane; $\partial B_t = \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid \mathbf{p}_t \mathbf{x} = m_t\}$. If we define $m_t = \mathbf{p}_t \mathbf{x}_t$, we automatically obtain that $\mathbf{x}_t \in \partial B_t$. If all budgets are linear and $m_t = \mathbf{p}_t \mathbf{x}_t$ for all $t \in T$, we also denote such data set by $\{\mathbf{p}_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}_{t \in T}$. This is the type of data set Afriat (1967) considered in his original study.

A utility function $u : \mathbb{R}_+^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ associates with any conceivable bundle $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$ a real number $u(\mathbf{x})$. We will consider the following properties of utility functions. A utility function u is *concave* if, for all $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$ and $\alpha \in [0, 1]$, $u(\alpha \mathbf{x} + (1 - \alpha)\mathbf{y}) \geq \alpha u(\mathbf{x}) + (1 - \alpha)u(\mathbf{y})$. A utility function is *quasi-concave* if the better-than sets are convex. Formally, for all \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} and $\mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$ and $\alpha \in [0, 1]$, we have that

$$u(\mathbf{x}) \leq \min\{u(\mathbf{y}), u(\mathbf{z})\} \Rightarrow u(\mathbf{x}) \leq u(\alpha \mathbf{y} + (1 - \alpha)\mathbf{z}).$$

A function u is *locally non-satiated* if, for all bundles $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$, there always exists a bundle arbitrarily close to \mathbf{x} that has higher utility than \mathbf{x} . Formally, for all open neighborhoods N of \mathbf{x} , there always exists a bundle \mathbf{y} in $N \cap \mathbb{R}_+^n$ such that $u(\mathbf{y}) > u(\mathbf{x})$. We say that a function u is *increasing* if, for all $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$, $\mathbf{x} \gg \mathbf{y}$ implies $u(\mathbf{x}) > u(\mathbf{y})$. Finally, a function u is *continuous* if, for all $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$, the better-than sets $\{\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid u(\mathbf{y}) > u(\mathbf{x})\}$ and the worse-than sets $\{\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid u(\mathbf{y}) < u(\mathbf{x})\}$ are open subsets of \mathbb{R}_+^n . Of course, if u is increasing and continuous, then we also have that $\mathbf{x} \geq \mathbf{y}$ implies $u(\mathbf{x}) \geq u(\mathbf{y})$.

A data set $S = \{B_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}_{t \in T}$ is said to be *rationalizable* if there exists a utility function that makes the observations consistent with utility maximization.

Definition 1 (Rationalizability). *A data set $S = \{B_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}_{t \in T}$ is rationalized by the utility function $u : \mathbb{R}_+^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ if, for all $t \in T$, \mathbf{x}_t maximizes $u(\mathbf{x})$ subject to the condition $\mathbf{x} \in B_t$, i.e.*

$$\mathbf{x}_t \in \arg \max_{\mathbf{x} \in B_t} u(\mathbf{x}).$$

2.2. Afriat's theorem

Building on the work of Afriat (1967), Varian (1982) presents a combinatorial condition for rationalizability by a concave, increasing and continuous utility function when all budget sets B_t are linear. Specifically, the condition requires data consistency with the so-called *generalized axiom of revealed preference* or GARP. Given our specific focus, it is useful to formulate this GARP condition for a setting with general (possibly nonlinear) budget sets.

Definition 2 (GARP). *The data set $S = \{B_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}_{t \in T}$ satisfies GARP if there exists a binary relation R such that*

- (i) if $\mathbf{x}_v \in B_t$, then $\mathbf{x}_t R \mathbf{x}_v$;
- (ii) if $\mathbf{x}_t R \mathbf{x}_v$ and $\mathbf{x}_v R \mathbf{x}_s$, then $\mathbf{x}_t R \mathbf{x}_s$;
- (iii) if $\mathbf{x}_t R \mathbf{x}_v$, then it is not the case that $\mathbf{x}_t \in B_v \setminus \partial B_v$.

The relation R in this definition is called the revealed preference relation. The first condition states that, if \mathbf{x}_t was chosen but \mathbf{x}_v was also available, then \mathbf{x}_t is revealed preferred to \mathbf{x}_v . For example, if budget sets are linear, we have $\mathbf{x}_t R \mathbf{x}_v$ whenever $\mathbf{p}_t \mathbf{x}_t \geq \mathbf{p}_t \mathbf{x}_v$. The second condition requires the revealed preference condition to be transitive. In words, if \mathbf{x}_t is revealed preferred to \mathbf{x}_v and \mathbf{x}_v is revealed preferred to \mathbf{x}_s , then \mathbf{x}_t is also revealed preferred to \mathbf{x}_s . The third condition requires that when \mathbf{x}_t is revealed preferred to \mathbf{x}_v , then \mathbf{x}_t should not be in the interior of B_v . Equivalently, if \mathbf{x}_t is revealed preferred to \mathbf{x}_v and $\mathbf{x}_t \in B_v$, i.e. \mathbf{x}_t was available when \mathbf{x}_v was in fact chosen, then \mathbf{x}_t must be on the boundary of B_v . In the case of linear budget sets, this requires $\mathbf{p}_v \mathbf{x}_v \leq \mathbf{p}_v \mathbf{x}_t$ whenever $\mathbf{x}_t R \mathbf{x}_v$. Observe that for every chosen bundle \mathbf{x}_t we automatically have that $\mathbf{x}_t R \mathbf{x}_t$. As such, GARP requires that each chosen bundle \mathbf{x}_t must be on the boundary of its own budget set B_t , i.e. $\mathbf{x}_t \in \partial B_t$.

We are now in a position to state Afriat's theorem (Varian (1982), based on Afriat (1967)). This result characterizes rationalizable data sets S in the case of linear budget sets.

Theorem 1 (Afriat's theorem). *Consider a data set $S = \{\mathbf{p}_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}_{t \in T}$ with linear budget sets. Then, the following statements are equivalent:*

- (i) *The data set S is rationalizable by a locally non-satiated and continuous utility function.*
- (ii) *The data set S satisfies GARP.*
- (iii) *For all $t \in T$, there exist numbers $U_t \geq 0$ and $\lambda_t > 0$ such that, for all $t, v \in T$:*

$$U_t - U_v \leq \lambda_v \mathbf{p}_v (\mathbf{x}_t - \mathbf{x}_v).$$

- (iv) *The data set S is rationalizable by an increasing, concave and continuous utility function.*

The theorem shows that when budget sets are linear, GARP (statement (ii)) provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the data to be rationalizable by a concave, increasing and continuous utility function. Statement (iii) gives an equivalent condition in terms of so-called Afriat inequalities, which are linear in the unknown variables U_t and λ_t .

Afriat's theorem has a remarkable implication: data rationalizability by a non-satiated utility function (statement (i)) is equivalent to rationalizability by an increasing and concave utility function (statement (iv)). As such, the theorem shows that, if budget sets are linear, it is impossible to accept rationalizability by a non-satiated utility function while rejecting it for a concave and increasing utility function. Essentially, this means that, under utility maximization, the property of concavity of utility functions is nontestable in the case of linear budget sets.

2.3. Nonlinear budget sets

The picture changes drastically if budgets are nonlinear. In such a setting, GARP consistency remains necessary and sufficient for rationalizability by an increasing utility function, but it is no longer sufficient for rationalizability by a concave utility function.

Forges and Minelli (2009) showed that GARP consistency is equivalent to rationalizability by an increasing utility function. To obtain this result, they considered the gauge function $\gamma_t : \mathbb{R}_+^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$, defined by,

$$\gamma_t(\mathbf{x}) = \inf\{\lambda > 0 \mid \mathbf{x}/\lambda \in B_t\}.$$

In words $\gamma_t(\mathbf{x})$ gives for the smallest number for which $\mathbf{x}/\gamma_t(\mathbf{x})$ belongs (or still belongs) to the budget set. In the case of linear budget sets, we obtain that $\gamma_t(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{p}_t \mathbf{x} / \mathbf{p}_t \mathbf{x}_t$.⁹ Then, building on a result of Foster, Scarf, and Todd (2004), Forges and Minelli proved the following theorem.

⁹In the case of linear budget sets, we have that $\mathbf{x}/\lambda \in B_t$ if and only if $\mathbf{p}_t \mathbf{x} / \lambda \leq \mathbf{p}_t \mathbf{x}_t$. This implies that $\mathbf{p}_t \mathbf{x} / \mathbf{p}_t \mathbf{x}_t \leq \lambda$.

Theorem 2 (Forges and Minelli (2009)). *Consider a data set $S = \{B_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}_{t \in T}$. Then, the following statements are equivalent:*

- (i) *The data set S is rationalizable by a locally non-satiated and continuous utility function.*
- (ii) *The data set S satisfies GARP.*
- (iii) *For all $t \in T$, there exist numbers $U_t \geq 0$ and $\lambda_t > 0$ such that, for all $t, v \in T$:*

$$U_t - U_v \leq \lambda_v(\gamma_v(\mathbf{x}_t) - 1).$$

- (iv) *There exist an increasing and continuous utility function that rationalizes the data set S .*

There is a clear correspondence between Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. However, a notable difference is that, for nonlinear budget sets, we lose the equivalence between rationalizability by an arbitrary (non-satiated) utility function and rationalizability by a concave utility function.

This last point is illustrated in Figure 1, which presents two budget sets, given by the surfaces enclosed by $\ell_1, \ell_2, 0$ and $\ell'_1, \ell'_2, 0$. The chosen bundles are represented by, respectively, the points \mathbf{x}_1 and \mathbf{x}_2 . It is easy to verify that this data set satisfies GARP. However, it is not rationalizable by a concave utility function, as we show by contradiction. Specifically, let us assume that the observations are rationalizable by a concave utility function. Then, because both budget sets are convex and the rationalizing utility function is concave, there must exist hyperplanes going through the chosen bundles that separate the corresponding budget sets from the better-than sets. As both budget sets are differentiable, these separating hyperplanes are uniquely defined. In Figure 1, these hyperplanes are given by the lines r_1, r_2 and r'_1, r'_2 . By construction, the areas below these hyperplanes contain bundles that have lower utility than the chosen bundles. As such, for any rationalizing (concave) utility function u , it must be that $u(\mathbf{x}_2) < u(\mathbf{x}_1)$ and $u(\mathbf{x}_1) < u(\mathbf{x}_2)$, which leads to the wanted contradiction.

Thus, we conclude that, in order to characterize rationalizability by a concave utility function under nonlinear budgets, we will have to modify the GARP condition. The next section addresses this issue.

3. Convex rationalizations on nonlinear budgets


This section establishes the characterization of data sets with nonlinear budgets that are rationalizable by convex preferences, i.e. there exists a rationalization by a quasi-concave utility function. A main ingredient of this characterization is the concept of co-convex hulls. We will first introduce this concept, after which we can define the associated notion of support sets. This will then allow us to state our main theorem, which defines the revealed preference conditions for a convex rationalization on general (possibly nonlinear) budget sets. To conclude this section, we illustrate the generality of our characterization by showing that it specializes to Matzkin (1991)'s characterizations.

3.1. Co-convex hulls and support sets

A set $H \subseteq \mathbb{R}_+^n$ is co-convex if its complement $\mathbb{R}_+^n \setminus H$ is convex, i.e. for all $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$ such that $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \notin H$ and all $\alpha \in [0, 1]$: $\alpha\mathbf{x} + (1 - \alpha)\mathbf{y} \notin H$. Next, take any observation (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) from a data set $S = \{B_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}_{t \in T}$. Intuitively, a co-convex hull of (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) gives a specific approximation of the set of bundles that are not better than \mathbf{x}_t (i.e. the complement of the better-than set of \mathbf{x}_t). Formally, it is defined as follows.

Definition 3 (co-convex hull). *Consider a data set $S = \{B_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}_{t \in T}$. The set H_t is a co-convex hull of an observation (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) if it satisfies the following properties:*

Figure 1: GARP and nonlinear budget sets



- (i) H_t is co-convex;
- (ii) H_t is closed and monotone;
- (iii) $B_t \subseteq H_t$;
- (iv) If $\mathbf{x} \gg \mathbf{x}_t$, then $\mathbf{x} \notin H_t$.

As explained above, the first condition requires that the complement of H_t is convex. The second condition imposes the same conditions on H_t as on B_t , i.e. closedness and monotonicity. The third condition requires that H_t contains the budget set B_t , which explains the use of the term ‘hull’. Finally, the fourth condition assumes that H_t does not contain any bundle that strictly dominates \mathbf{x}_t in all dimensions; this complies with the above interpretation of H_t as approximating the complement of the better-than set of \mathbf{x}_t .

The following lemma makes clear that the concept of co-convex hulls is well-defined for some observation (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) if and only if \mathbf{x}_t belongs to the boundary of the budget set B_t .

Lemma 1. Consider a data set $S = \{B_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}_{t \in T}$. The observation (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) has a co-convex hull if and only if $\mathbf{x}_t \in \partial B_t$.

In what follows, we will also use the concept of minimal co-convex hulls.

Definition 4 (Minimal co-convex hull). Consider a data set $S = \{B_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}_{t \in T}$. The set H_t is a minimal co-convex hull of the observation (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) if

- (i) H_t is a co-convex hull of (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) ;
- (ii) for any other co-convex hull H'_t of (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) , if $H'_t \subseteq H_t$, then $H'_t = H_t$.

The next lemma states that any observation with a co-convex hull also has a minimal co-convex hull. At this point, it is worth indicating that a minimal co-convex hull should not necessarily be unique.

Lemma 2. *Consider a data set $S = \{B_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}_{t \in T}$. The observation (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) has a minimal co-convex hull if and only if $\mathbf{x}_t \in \partial B_t$.*

It is well known that any closed and convex set can be written as the intersection of a collection of closed half spaces.¹⁰ As a consequence, its complement, which is an open and co-convex set, can be written as a union of open half spaces. The following exposition provides an embodiment of this idea applied to co-convex hulls.

Consider a co-convex hull H_t of (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) . By definition, the complement of this set, i.e. $\mathbb{R}_+^n \setminus H_t$, is an open and convex set. As such, its closure can be written as the intersection of its supporting half spaces. An element \mathbf{x} in such a half space then satisfies a condition of the form

$$\mathbf{p}_t^i \mathbf{x} \geq m_t^i,$$

for some vector $\mathbf{p}_t^i \in \mathbb{R}^n$ and some number $m_t^i \in \mathbb{R}$. Given that budget sets are monotone sets that are subsets of the positive orthant, we can assume, without loss of generality, that $\mathbf{p}_t^i \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$, $\mathbf{p}_t^i \neq 0$ and $m_t^i > 0$. Moreover, any rescaling $(\alpha \mathbf{p}_t^i, \alpha m_t^i)$ of (\mathbf{p}_t^i, m_t^i) represents the same half space and as such we can always normalize these half spaces by setting $m_t^i = 1$. Summarizing, there exists a set $A_t = \{\mathbf{p}_t^i \in \mathbb{R}_+^n\}$ of price vectors such that \mathbf{x} is in the closure of $\mathbb{R}_+^n \setminus H_t$ if and only if $\mathbf{p}_t^i \mathbf{x} \geq 1$ for all $\mathbf{p}_t^i \in A_t$.

The complement of the closed convex set $\mathbb{R}_+^n \setminus H_t$ is thus given by bundles $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$ that satisfy $\min_{\mathbf{p}_t^i \in A_t} \mathbf{p}_t^i \mathbf{x} < 1$. This complement equals the interior of H_t and therefore its closure is H_t . This implies that H_t consists of all bundles \mathbf{x} with $\min_{\mathbf{p}_t^i \in A_t} \mathbf{p}_t^i \mathbf{x} \leq 1$. As a consequence, the boundary ∂H_t can be defined by the bundles \mathbf{x} for which $\min_{\mathbf{p}_t^i \in A_t} \mathbf{p}_t^i \mathbf{x} = 1$. In the following, we will abuse terminology and call A_t the *support set* of the co-convex hull H_t .

3.2. A general result

Our main theorem characterizes data sets for which there exists a convex rationalization, i.e. the data set is rationalizable by a quasi-concave utility function (or, equivalently, convex preferences).

Theorem 3. *Consider a data set $S = \{B_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}_{t \in T}$. Then, the following statements are equivalent:*

- (i) *The data set S is rationalizable by a locally non-satiated, quasi-concave and continuous utility function.*
- (ii) *For all $t \in T$, there exists a minimal co-convex hull H_t of (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) such that the set $\{H_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}_{t \in T}$ satisfies GARP.*
- (iii) *For all $t \in T$, there exists a minimal co-convex hull H_t of (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) with associated support set A_t , and there exist numbers $U_t \geq 0$ and $\lambda_t > 0$ such that, for all $t, v \in T$:*

$$U_t - U_v \leq \lambda_v \left(\min_{\mathbf{p}_v^i \in A_v} \mathbf{p}_v^i \mathbf{x}_t - 1 \right).$$

- (iv) *The data set S is rationalizable by an increasing, concave and continuous utility function.*

¹⁰See, for example, Rockafellar (1970), Corollary 11.7.1.

This theorem clearly mirrors Afriat’s theorem. The main difference in statement (ii) of Theorem 3 is that it requires GARP consistency not in terms of the observed budget sets but in terms of a collection of minimal co-convex hulls. As indicated above, a minimal co-convex hull of (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) should not be uniquely defined in general and, therefore, verifying statement (ii) of Theorem 3 can be considerably more difficult than verifying GARP for the original data set $\{B_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}_{t \in T}$. Statement (iii) gives a set of corresponding Afriat inequalities in terms of the support sets of the minimal co-convex hulls. Below, we will show that these inequalities reduce to the usual Afriat inequalities in the case of linear budget sets. More generally, in Section 4 we point out a number of specific cases in which the inequalities in statement (iii) become linear in unknowns, which is useful for practical applications. At this point, we indicate that, conditional on the minimal co-convex hulls, the ‘generalized’ Afriat inequalities in statement (iii) of Theorem 3 are linear in the unobservable variables U_t and λ_t . A final important observation is that the equivalence between statements (i) and (iv) implies that it is impossible to verify concavity separately from quasi-concavity, even if we allow for nonlinear budget sets.

One final remark is in order. Statements (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 3 require the co-convex hulls H_t to be minimal. However, it is easy to verify in the theorem’s proof that the result also holds if we consider any co-convex hull rather than a minimal one. This gives the following equivalence result.¹¹

Corollary 1. *Consider a data set $S = \{B_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}_{t \in T}$. Then, the following statements are equivalent:*

- (i) *For all $t \in T$, there exists a minimal co-convex hull H_t of (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) , with associated support set A_t , such that the set $\{H_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}_{t \in T}$ satisfies GARP or, equivalently, there exist numbers $U_t \geq 0$ and $\lambda_t > 0$ such that, for all $t, v \in T$: $U_t - U_v \leq \lambda_v (\min_{\mathbf{p}_v \in A_v} \mathbf{p}_v \mathbf{x}_t - 1)$.*
- (ii) *For all $t \in T$, there exists a co-convex hull H_t of (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) , with associated support set A_t , such that the set $\{H_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}_{t \in T}$ satisfies GARP or, equivalently, there exist numbers $U_t \geq 0$ and $\lambda_t > 0$ such that, for all $t, v \in T$: $U_t - U_v \leq \lambda_v (\min_{\mathbf{p}_v \in A_v} \mathbf{p}_v \mathbf{x}_t - 1)$.*

We have chosen to state Theorem 3 in its current form because the set of minimal co-convex hulls is the smallest set of co-convex hulls for which our theorem holds. This effectively makes that the theorem provides the sharpest formulation of the rationalizability conditions: in principle, it suffices to (only) consider the minimal co-convex hulls when verifying rationalizability.¹² However, the result in Corollary 1 is a useful one from a practical point of view. It allows us to conclude that there exists a convex rationalization of some data set as soon as we can find one specification of co-convex hulls (not necessarily minimal) that satisfies the conditions in statement (ii) of Corollary 1. Moreover, and important for the sequel, the equivalence in Corollary 1 will be directly useful for defining operational tests of rationalizability in Section 4.

3.3. Special cases

As indicated in the Introduction, Matzkin (1991) considers two extensions of Afriat’s theorem to nonlinear budget sets. The first extension assumes that every budget set is co-convex. The second extension assumes that every budget set has a unique supporting hyperplane through the chosen bundle that contains the budget in one of the half spaces defined by this hyperplane. In what follows, we will

¹¹For compactness, we do not include an explicit proof in the Appendix.

¹²Indeed, if we exclude some minimal co-convex hull to verify statement (ii) or, equivalently, statement (iii) of Theorem 3, then it may be that we erroneously reject rationalizability. Specifically, we can construct data sets that are rationalizable but violate the GARP condition for all but one minimal co-convex hull.

show that Theorem 3 captures Matzkin's characterizations as limiting cases, and we use this to subsequently show that our general result reduces to Afriat (1967)'s original conditions in the case of linear budget sets.

Co-convex budget sets. If the budget set B_t is co-convex and $\mathbf{x}_t \in \partial B_t$, then one can easily verify that B_t is the unique minimal co-convex hull of (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) . As a consequence, we obtain the following corollary, which follows from combining Theorems 2 and 3.

Corollary 2. *Consider a data set $S = \{B_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}$ and assume that every budget set B_t is co-convex. Then, the following statements are equivalent:*

- (i) *The data set S is rationalizable by a locally non-satiated and continuous utility function.*
- (ii) *The data set S satisfies GARP.*
- (iii) *For all $t \in T$, there exist numbers $U_t \geq 0$ and $\lambda_t > 0$ such that, for all $t, v \in T$:*

$$U_t - U_v \leq \lambda_v \left(\min_{\mathbf{p}_v \in A_v} \mathbf{p}_v \mathbf{x}_t - 1 \right),$$

where for all $t \in T$, A_t is the support set of B_t .

- (iv) *The data set is rationalizable by an increasing, concave and continuous utility function.*

This characterization coincides with Matzkin's rationalizability characterization except that it includes an additional characterization in terms of Afriat inequalities (statement (iii)).

Convex budget sets. In a second setting, Matzkin assumed that every budget set B_t has a unique supporting hyperplane at \mathbf{x}_t that contains the entire budget set in one of the half spaces defined by this hyperplane. As indicated in the Introduction, the same setting was considered by Forges and Minelli (2009). Under the stated assumptions, it is easy to verify that there is a unique minimal co-convex hull of the observation (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) , which is defined by the half space produced by the (unique) supporting hyperplane. Then, applying Theorem 3 to this case, we directly obtain Matzkin's result, which we again extend by adding a characterization in terms of Afriat inequalities (see also Forges and Minelli (2009, Proposition 4)).

Linear budget sets. To conclude, given that linear budget sets are co-convex by construction, we can also show that Corollary 2 complies with Afriat's theorem in the case of linear budget sets. More specifically, for linear budget sets the support set A_t consists of a single element, i.e. the normalized price vector \mathbf{p}_t/m_t . Thus, the inequalities in statement (iii) of Corollary 2 reduce to the standard Afriat inequalities:

$$\begin{aligned} U_t - U_v &\leq \lambda_v \left(\frac{\mathbf{p}_v}{m_v} \mathbf{x}_t - 1 \right) \\ &= \lambda'_v \mathbf{p}_v (\mathbf{x}_t - \mathbf{x}_v), \end{aligned}$$

where λ'_v is defined as λ_v/m_v .

4. Practical tests

The general result in Theorem 3 is essentially a theoretical one. It does not provide guidelines for testing the revealed preference conditions in specific applications. In this section, we consider the operationalization of the conditions. We show that verifying our testable implications for convex rationalizations boils down to checking linear inequalities when assuming that budget sets can be written as finite unions of polyhedral convex sets. Importantly, we note that this assumption is not restrictive from an applied point of view, as we can always approximate any budget set arbitrarily close as a union of polyhedral convex sets.

To facilitate our exposition, we first consider the limiting case where each budget set is represented as a single polyhedral convex set. Subsequently, we generalize towards budget sets characterized as finite unions of polyhedral convex sets.

4.1. Polyhedral convex sets

A budget set is polyhedral convex if it can be written as the intersection of a finite number of half spaces. Formally, we have that B_t is polyhedral convex if there exists a finite set $K_t = \{\mathbf{q}_t^i \in \mathbb{R}_+^n\}$ such that

$$B_t = \left\{ \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid \max_{\mathbf{q}_t^i \in K_t} \mathbf{q}_t^i \mathbf{x} \leq 1 \right\}.$$

We can now verify the next result.

Lemma 3. *Consider a data set $S = \{B_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}$. If B_t is polyhedral convex and H_t is a minimal co-convex hull of the observation (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) , then*

$$H_t = \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid \mathbf{p}_t \mathbf{x} \leq 1\},$$

where \mathbf{p}_t is a convex combination of the vectors $\mathbf{q}_t^i \in K_t$.

This characterization of minimal co-convex hulls allows for an efficient operationalization of the characterization in Theorem 3 under polyhedral convex budget sets. To see this, consider the collection of half spaces \mathcal{H}_t such that, for all $H_t \in \mathcal{H}_t$, there exist numbers $\alpha_t^i \in \mathbb{R}_+$, with $\sum_{i=1}^{|K_t|} \alpha_t^i = 1$, and

$$H_t = \left\{ \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid \begin{array}{l} \sum_{i=1}^{|K_t|} \alpha_t^i \mathbf{q}_t^i \mathbf{x} \leq 1 \text{ and,} \\ \sum_{i=1}^{|K_t|} \alpha_t^i \mathbf{q}_t^i \mathbf{x}_t = 1 \end{array} \right\}.$$

Every element of the collection \mathcal{H}_t is clearly a co-convex hull of (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) . Moreover, from above we know that \mathcal{H}_t contains all minimal co-convex hulls of (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) . So, applying Corollary 1 to this setting gives the following result.

Corollary 3. *Consider a data set $S = \{B_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}_{t \in T}$ where each budget set B_t is polyhedral convex. Then, the following statements are equivalent:*

- (i) *The data set is rationalizable by a locally non-satiated, quasi-concave and continuous utility function.*
- (ii) *For each t , there exist a vector \mathbf{p}_t , which is a convex combination of the vectors $\mathbf{q}_t \in K_t$, such that $\{H_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}$ satisfies GARP, with $H_t = \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid \mathbf{p}_t \mathbf{x} \leq 1\}$ and $\mathbf{p}_t \mathbf{x}_t = 1$.*
- (iii) *For each $t \in T$, there exist numbers $U_t \geq 0$, $\lambda_t > 0$ and $\alpha_t^i \geq 0$ ($i = 1, \dots, |K_t|$) such that, for all $t, v \in T$:*

- $U_t - U_v \leq \lambda_v \left(\sum_{i=1}^{|K_v|} \alpha_v^i \mathbf{q}_v^i \mathbf{x}_t - 1 \right)$;
- $\sum_{i=1}^{|K_t|} \alpha_t^i = 1$;
- $\sum_{i=1}^{|K_t|} \alpha_t^i \mathbf{q}_t^i \mathbf{x}_t = 1$.

(iv) *The data set is rationalizable by an increasing, concave and continuous utility function.*

Statement (iii) in this result is particularly useful from a practical point of view. Specifically, it can be rewritten in the following form:

For each $t \in T$, there exist numbers $U_t \geq 0, \lambda_t > 0$ and $\tilde{\alpha}_t^i \geq 0, i = 1, \dots, |K_t|$, such that, for all $t, v \in T$:

- $U_t - U_v \leq \left(\sum_{i=1}^{|K_v|} \tilde{\alpha}_v^i \mathbf{q}_v^i \mathbf{x}_t - \lambda_v \right)$;
- $\sum_{i=1}^{|K_t|} \tilde{\alpha}_t^i = \lambda_t$;
- $\sum_{i=1}^{|K_t|} \tilde{\alpha}_t^i \mathbf{q}_t^i \mathbf{x}_t = \lambda_t$.

This obtains a set of inequalities that are linear in the unknowns U_t, λ_t and $\tilde{\alpha}_t^i$. As such, feasibility can be verified by using conventional linear programming techniques, which means that the conditions for convex rationalizations can be checked efficiently (i.e. in polynomial time).

4.2. Finite unions of polyhedral convex sets

Let us then consider the case where budget sets can be written as finite unions of polyhedral convex sets. Specifically, let B_t be a finite union of ℓ_t closed, monotonic and polyhedral convex sets B_t^j . Let $K_t^j = \{\mathbf{q}_t^j \in \mathbf{R}_+^n\}$ again denote the set of vectors such that

$$B_t^j = \left\{ \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid \max_{\mathbf{q}_t^j \in K_t^j} \mathbf{q}_t^j \mathbf{x} \leq 1 \right\}.$$

We then obtain the following generalization of Lemma 3.

Lemma 4. *Consider a data set $S = \{B_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}$. If B_t is a finite union of polyhedral convex sets and H_t is a minimal co-convex hull of the observation (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) , then*

$$H_t = \left\{ \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid \min_{j=1, \dots, \ell_t} \mathbf{p}_t^j \mathbf{x} \leq 1 \right\},$$

where for all $j = 1, \dots, \ell_t$, \mathbf{p}_t^j is a convex combination of the vectors $\mathbf{q}_t^j \in K_t^j$ and $\min_{j=1, \dots, \ell_t} \mathbf{p}_t^j \mathbf{x}_t = 1$.

A similar reasoning as before now leads to the next result.

Corollary 4. *Consider a data set $S = \{B_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}_{t \in T}$ where each B_t is a finite union of polyhedral convex sets B_t^j with $j = 1, \dots, \ell_t$. Then, the following statements are equivalent:*

(i) The data set S is rationalizable by a locally non-satiated, quasi-concave and continuous utility function.

(ii) For all $t \in T$ and $j = 1, \dots, \ell_t$, there exist numbers $\alpha_t^{j,i} \geq 0$, with $i = 1, \dots, |K_t^j|$, such that

- $\sum_{i=1}^{|K_t^j|} \alpha_t^{j,i} = 1$;
- $\min_j \sum_{i=1}^{|K_t^j|} \alpha_t^{j,i} \mathbf{q}_t^{j,i} \mathbf{x}_t = 1$;
- $\{H_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}_{t \in T}$ satisfies GARP, where,

$$H_t = \left\{ \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid \min_{j=1, \dots, \ell_t} \sum_{i=1}^{|K_t^j|} \alpha_t^{j,i} \mathbf{q}_t^{j,i} \mathbf{x} \leq 1 \right\}.$$

(iii) For all $t \in T$ and $j = 1, \dots, \ell_t$, there exist there exist numbers $U_t \geq 0$ and $\lambda_t > 0$ and $\alpha_t^{j,i} \geq 0$, $i = 1, \dots, |K_t^j|$, such that, for all $t, v \in T$ and $j = 1, \dots, \ell_t$:

- $U_t - U_v \leq \lambda_v \left(\sum_{i=1}^{|K_v^j|} \alpha_v^{j,i} \mathbf{q}_v^{j,i} \mathbf{x}_t - 1 \right)$;
- $\sum_{i=1}^{|K_t^j|} \alpha_t^{j,i} = 1$;
- $\sum_{i=1}^{|K_t^j|} \alpha_t^{j,i} \mathbf{q}_t^{j,i} \mathbf{x}_t \geq 1$;
- if $\mathbf{x}_t \in B_t^m$ then $\sum_{i=1}^{K_t^m} \tilde{\alpha}_t^{m,i} \mathbf{q}_t^{m,i} \mathbf{x}_t = 1$.

(iv) The data set S is rationalizable by an increasing, concave and continuous utility function.

At this point, it is worth comparing the result in Corollary 4 to an original result of Yatchew (1985). This author also considers the setting where budget sets are defined as finite unions of polyhedral convex sets. However, his analysis differs from ours in three ways. First of all, he assumes that utility functions are concave. By contrast, we relax this assumption by focusing on quasi-concavity. Although this may seem like a small difference, the additional assumption of concavity (beyond quasi-concavity) greatly simplifies the revealed preference analysis (see Diewert (2012) for an in depth discussion of this). Second, Yatchew only considers revealed preference conditions in terms of Afriat-type inequalities (i.e. statement (iii) of Corollary 4), while we also provide conditions in terms of GARP-type restrictions (i.e. statement (ii) of Corollary 4). Finally, and most importantly, Yatchew obtains revealed preference restrictions that are quadratic in unknowns. While quadratic restrictions are in general very hard to solve, our set of inequalities can be implemented efficiently through linear programming techniques. Indeed, it is easy to see that statement (iii) of Corollary 4 can be rewritten in the following linear form:

For all $t \in T$ and $j = 1, \dots, \ell_t$, there exist there exist numbers $U_t \geq 0$ and $\lambda_t > 0$ and $\alpha_t^{j,i} \geq 0$, $i = 1, \dots, |K_t^j|$, such that, for all $t, v \in T$ and $j = 1, \dots, \ell_t$:

- $U_t - U_v \leq \sum_{i=1}^{|K_v^j|} \tilde{\alpha}_v^{j,i} \mathbf{q}_v^{j,i} \mathbf{x}_t - \lambda_v$;
- $\sum_{i=1}^{|K_t^j|} \tilde{\alpha}_t^{j,i} = \lambda_t$;
- $\sum_{i=1}^{|K_t^j|} \tilde{\alpha}_t^{j,i} \mathbf{q}_t^{j,i} \mathbf{x}_t \geq \lambda_t$;
- if $\mathbf{x}_t \in B_t^m$ then $\sum_{i=1}^{|K_t^m|} \tilde{\alpha}_t^{m,i} \mathbf{q}_t^{m,i} \mathbf{x}_t = \lambda_t$.

5. Conclusion

We have generalized Afriat's theorem by providing a revealed preference characterization for convex rationalizations on nonlinear budget sets. This establishes the testable implications associated with rationalizing consumption behavior by a quasi-concave utility function (i.e. convex preferences). Interestingly, we also showed that, in practice, the conditions for convex rationalizations are efficiently verifiable in that they only require checking a finite number of inequalities that are linear in unknowns.

We see different possible applications of our theoretical results. First of all, our characterizations allow us to verify if utility functions can be assumed to be quasi-concave. This can proceed in two steps. First, we verify GARP consistency for the data set $\{B_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}_{t \in T}$. Subsequently, we then additionally check whether this data set satisfies the revealed preference conditions in Theorem 3. If the data pass the first test but fail the second, then they are rationalizable by an increasing utility function (see Theorem 2) but not by a quasi-concave one. This test can be particularly useful to check the empirical validity of economic models that heavily rely on convex preferences.

More generally, our characterizations could also be used to verify rationalizability of consumption behavior in the case of nonlinear budget sets. As indicated in the Introduction, prime examples concern labor supply, intertemporal consumption, models of household production and specific game theoretic situations. In this respect, our characterization of convex rationalizations not only allows for simply testing rationalizability. It also forms a useful basis for addressing recovery and forecasting questions under the maintained assumption of quasi-concave utility. See, for example, Varian (1982) for a detailed discussion on recovery and forecasting analysis based on Afriat's theorem (for linear budget sets). His analysis is readily translated to our setting.

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Appendix: proofs

Proof of Lemma 1

Sufficiency. Assume that $\mathbf{x}_t \in \partial B_t$ and consider the set

$$H_t = \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid \text{not } \mathbf{x} \gg \mathbf{x}_t\}.$$

Let us verify the four properties in Definition 3 to show that H_t is a co-convex hull of (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) . Firstly, the complement of H_t is the set $\{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid \mathbf{x} \gg \mathbf{x}_t\}$, which is clearly convex. Next, by construction H_t is both closed and monotone. For the third property (i.e. $B_t \subseteq H_t$), let us assume that there exists a bundle $\mathbf{y} \in B_t$ such that $\mathbf{y} \notin H_t$. This implies that $\mathbf{y} \gg \mathbf{x}_t$, which contradicts $\mathbf{x}_t \in \partial B_t$. This contradiction shows that the third property holds. Finally, the fourth requirement follows immediately from the definition of H_t .

Necessity. We prove this by contradiction. Assume that (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) has a co-convex hull and that $\mathbf{x}_t \notin \partial B_t$. This implies that there exists a bundle $\mathbf{y} \in B_t$ such that $\mathbf{y} \gg \mathbf{x}_t$. Since H_t includes B_t , we thus have that $\mathbf{y} \in H_t$. The latter contradicts with property (iv) of Definition 3, which proves the result.

Proof of Lemma 2

Sufficiency. The proof is an application of Zorn's Lemma. Assume that $\mathbf{x}_t \in \partial B_t$. Then, from Lemma 1 we know that (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) has at least one co-convex hull. Let Σ be the set of all co-convex hulls of (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) . Consider a chain in Σ , say

$$H_t^0 \supseteq H_t^1 \supseteq \dots \supseteq H_t^j \supseteq \dots$$

In order to apply Zorn's Lemma, we need to show that this chain has a lower bound in Σ . Take $H_t = \bigcap_{j \in \mathbb{N}} H_t^j$ and let us verify the four properties in Definition 3 to show that H_t is a co-convex hull of (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) . Firstly, let $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$ with $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \notin H_t$. From this, we have that there must exist numbers i and j such that $\mathbf{x} \notin H_t^i$ and $\mathbf{y} \notin H_t^j$. Assume, without loss of generality, that $H_t^i \subseteq H_t^j$, hence $\mathbf{y} \notin H_t^i$. Then, as H_t^i is co-convex, we obtain that $\alpha \mathbf{x} + (1 - \alpha) \mathbf{y} \notin H_t^i$ for all $\alpha \in [0, 1]$. As such, $\alpha \mathbf{x} + (1 - \alpha) \mathbf{y} \notin H_t$, which shows that H_t is co-convex.

For the second property, we have that H_t is closed and monotone by construction as it is the intersection of closed and monotone sets.

We prove the third property ad absurdum. Let $\mathbf{y} \in B_t$ and $\mathbf{y} \notin H_t$. Then, there must be a number j such that $\mathbf{y} \notin H_t^j$. However, this contradicts with H_t^j being a co-convex hull of (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) .

We also prove the fourth property ad absurdum. Let $\mathbf{y} \gg \mathbf{x}_t$ and assume $\mathbf{y} \in H_t$. This implies that for all $j \in \mathbb{N}$, $\mathbf{y} \in H_t^j$. However, this contradicts with every H_t^j being a co-convex hull of (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) .

As such we conclude that H_t is a co-convex hull, which is by construction of lower bound of our sequence. From Zorn's lemma, we then obtain that Σ has a minimal element, which concludes the proof.

Necessity. To see the reverse, we simply have to note that, if (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) has a minimal co-convex hull, then it also has a co-convex hull. Thus, from Lemma 1 we conclude that $\mathbf{x}_t \in \partial B_t$.

Proof of Theorem 3

(i)→(ii).. Assume that the data set $S = \{B_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}_{t \in T}$ is rationalizable by a locally non-satiated, quasi-concave and continuous utility function u . Let us start by showing that $\mathbf{x}_t \in \partial B_t$ for all $t \in T$. Indeed, if $\mathbf{x}_t \notin \partial B_t$, then there must exist a bundle $\mathbf{y} \gg \mathbf{x}_t$ with $\mathbf{y} \in B_t$. Given this and B_t being monotone, there must exist an open neighborhood N of \mathbf{x}_t such that $N \cap \mathbb{R}_+^n$ is contained in B_t . As such, by local non-satiation there must exist an element $\mathbf{x}' \in N \cap \mathbb{R}_+^n$ such that $u(\mathbf{x}') > u(\mathbf{x}_t)$. This contradicts the assumption that u rationalizes S .

Given this, we can use Lemma 2 to show that (ii) is well defined, i.e. for ever observation (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) , we can find a minimal co-convex hull. To do this, we will make use of the following lemma, which states that there always exist a minimal co-convex hull that is contained in the not-better-than set.

Lemma 5. *If u is a locally non-satiated, quasi-concave and continuous utility function that rationalizes S , then there exists, for all $t \in T$, a minimal co-convex hull H_t of (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) such that we have, for all $\mathbf{y} \in H_t$ that $u(\mathbf{x}_t) \geq u(\mathbf{y})$ and, for all $\mathbf{y} \in H_t - \partial H_t$, that $u(\mathbf{x}_t) > u(\mathbf{y})$.*

Proof. Let (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) be an observation of S and let H'_t be the complement of the following set

$$C = \{ \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid \exists \mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n, \mathbf{y} \geq \mathbf{z} \text{ and } u(\mathbf{z}) > u(\mathbf{x}_t) \}.$$

Let us verify the four properties in Definition 3 to show that H'_t is a co-convex hull of (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) .

Firstly, to show that H'_t is co-convex, let us consider two bundles $\mathbf{y}_1, \mathbf{y}_2 \in C$ and let $\mathbf{y} = \alpha \mathbf{y}_1 + (1 - \alpha) \mathbf{y}_2$ with $\alpha \in [0, 1]$. By construction there exist then bundles $\mathbf{z}_1 \leq \mathbf{y}_1$ and $\mathbf{z}_2 \leq \mathbf{y}_2$ such that $u(\mathbf{x}_t) < u(\mathbf{z}_1)$ and $u(\mathbf{x}_t) < u(\mathbf{z}_2)$. As the utility function u is quasi-concave, it follows that $u(\mathbf{x}_t) < u(\alpha \mathbf{z}_1 + (1 - \alpha) \mathbf{z}_2)$. Since $\alpha \mathbf{y}_1 + (1 - \alpha) \mathbf{y}_2 \geq \alpha \mathbf{z}_1 + (1 - \alpha) \mathbf{z}_2$, we then obtain that $\mathbf{y} \in C$. This shows that C is a convex set and thus that H'_t is co-convex.

Secondly, as the complement of an open set, H'_t is by definition closed. To show that H'_t is also monotone, consider $\mathbf{x} \in H'_t$ and $\mathbf{x} \geq \mathbf{y}$. Let us assume that $\mathbf{y} \notin H'_t$. This implies that there exists a $\mathbf{z} \leq \mathbf{y}$ such that $u(\mathbf{z}) > u(\mathbf{x}_t)$. But then $\mathbf{x} \geq \mathbf{y} \geq \mathbf{z}$ and $u(\mathbf{z}) > u(\mathbf{x})$, hence, $\mathbf{x} \notin H'_t$, which gives us the desired contradiction.

Thirdly, to show that $B_t \subseteq H'_t$, let us consider any $\mathbf{x} \in B_t$. If $\mathbf{x} \notin H'_t$, then there must exist a bundle \mathbf{z} such that $\mathbf{x} \geq \mathbf{z}$ and $u(\mathbf{z}) > u(\mathbf{x}_t)$. As B_t is monotone, we have that $\mathbf{z} \in B_t$. But, then, $u(\mathbf{x}_t) \geq u(\mathbf{z})$, since u rationalizes S . This contradiction shows that $B_t \subseteq H'_t$.

Fourthly, we need show that for all $\mathbf{y} \gg \mathbf{x}_t$, we have that $\mathbf{y} \notin H'_t$. If $\mathbf{y} \gg \mathbf{x}_t$, there always exists a small neighborhood N of \mathbf{x}_t such that for all $\mathbf{z} \in N \cap \mathbb{R}_+^n$, we have that $\mathbf{y} \gg \mathbf{z}$. By local non-satiation, we then obtain that there exist at least one bundle in $N \cap \mathbb{R}_+^n$, say \mathbf{w} , such that $u(\mathbf{w}) > u(\mathbf{x}_t)$. This gives us a bundle \mathbf{w} such that $\mathbf{y} \geq \mathbf{w}$ and $u(\mathbf{w}) > u(\mathbf{x}_t)$ and thus $\mathbf{y} \notin H'_t$.

From the above it follows that H'_t is a co-convex hull of (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) . Using a similar reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 2, it follows that for every co-convex hull H'_t , there always exists a minimal co-convex hull $H_t \subseteq H'_t$. To conclude, we must show that H_t satisfies the requirements mentioned at the end of Lemma 5. If $\mathbf{y} \in H_t$, then, as $H_t \subseteq H'_t$, it must be that for all $\mathbf{z} \leq \mathbf{y}$, $u(\mathbf{x}_t) \geq u(\mathbf{z})$. In particular, we have that $u(\mathbf{x}_t) \geq u(\mathbf{y})$. Next, if $\mathbf{y} \in H_t$ and $\mathbf{y} \notin \partial H_t$, then, by local non-satiation, there exists a bundle $\mathbf{z} \in H_t$, such that $u(\mathbf{z}) > u(\mathbf{y})$. Also, as $\mathbf{z} \in H_t$ it must be that $u(\mathbf{x}_t) \geq u(\mathbf{z})$. Therefore, $u(\mathbf{x}_t) > u(\mathbf{y})$. \square

We can now complete the first part of the proof of Theorem 3. For each observation (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) we select a minimal co-convex hull H_t as characterized in Lemma 5. This allows us to show that the data set $\{H_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}_{t \in T}$ satisfies GARP. If $\mathbf{x}_v \in H_t$, then, by Lemma 5, we know that $u(\mathbf{x}_t) \geq u(\mathbf{x}_v)$. Therefore, $\mathbf{x}_t R \mathbf{x}_v$ implies $u(\mathbf{x}_t) \geq u(\mathbf{x}_v)$. Now assume that the result does not hold, i.e. GARP is violated. Then,

there must exist bundles $\mathbf{x}_t, \mathbf{x}_v$ such that $\mathbf{x}_t R \mathbf{x}_v, \mathbf{x}_v \in H_t$ and $\mathbf{x}_v \notin \partial H_t$. This implies that $u(\mathbf{x}_t) \geq u(\mathbf{x}_v)$ and, by Lemma 5, $u(\mathbf{x}_t) > u(\mathbf{x}_v)$, which gives a contradiction. This contradiction shows that (i) implies (ii).

(ii) \rightarrow (iii).. For each observation (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) , consider a minimal co-convex hull H_t such that $\{H_t, \mathbf{x}_t\}_{t \in T}$ satisfies GARP. Let A_t be the support set of H_t . This implies that $\mathbf{x} \in H_t$ if and only if $\min_{\mathbf{p}_t \in A_t} \mathbf{p}_t \mathbf{x} \leq 1$. For all $t \in T$ define

$$a_{t,v} = \min_{\mathbf{p}_t \in A_t} \mathbf{p}_t \mathbf{x}_v - 1.$$

We have that $a_{t,v} \leq 0$ if and only if $\mathbf{x}_v \in H_t$ and that $a_{t,v} < 0$ if $\mathbf{x}_v \in H_t$ and $\mathbf{x}_v \notin \partial H_t$. Therefore, GARP imposes, for all sequences t, r, s, \dots, q, v in T , $a_{t,r} \leq 0, a_{r,s} \leq 0, \dots, a_{q,v} \leq 0$ and $a_{v,t} \leq 0$ only if all inequalities are actually equalities. Then, using a result from Fostel, Scarf, and Todd (2004), we can show that there exist numbers U_t and strict positive numbers λ_t such that, for all $t, v \in T$,

$$\begin{aligned} U_t - U_v &\leq \lambda_v a_{v,t} \\ &= \lambda_v \left(\min_{\mathbf{p}_v \in A_v} \mathbf{p}_v \mathbf{x}_t - 1 \right). \end{aligned}$$

This shows that (ii) implies (iii).

(iii) \rightarrow (iv).. The function $\gamma_t(\mathbf{y}) = \min_{\mathbf{p}_t \in A_t} \mathbf{p}_t \mathbf{y} - 1$ takes the minimum over a set of affine and increasing functions. This function is concave, increasing and continuous by construction. Observe that, for all $t \in T$, $\gamma_t(\mathbf{x}_t) = 0$ and, if $\mathbf{y} \in B_t$, then $\gamma_t(\mathbf{y}) \leq 0$.

Now, define the function u such that

$$u(\mathbf{y}) = \min_{t \in T} U_t + \lambda_t \gamma_t(\mathbf{y}).$$

As u is the minimum over a finite set of concave, increasing and continuous functions, it is also concave, increasing and continuous. We still have to show that u rationalizes the data set S . Let $\mathbf{y} \in B_t$, which implies that $\gamma_t(\mathbf{y}) \leq 0$. Then,

$$\begin{aligned} u(\mathbf{y}) &\leq U_t + \lambda_t \gamma_t(\mathbf{y}) \\ &\leq U_t \\ &= u(\mathbf{x}_t). \end{aligned}$$

This shows that u rationalizes the data set S , i.e. (iii) implies (iv).

(iv) \rightarrow (i).. This is trivial.

Proof of Lemma 3

As a preliminary step, because the observation (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) has a minimal co-convex hull H_t , we can use $\mathbf{x}_t \in \partial B_t$. Then, let P_t represent the set of all \mathbf{p}_t that are convex combinations of the vectors $\mathbf{q}_t \in K_t$ such that $\mathbf{q}_t \mathbf{x}_t = 1$, i.e. each $\mathbf{p}_t \in P_t$ defines a supporting hyperplane of B_t at \mathbf{x}_t . It is easy to verify that, for any $\mathbf{p}_t \in P_t$, the set $H_t = \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid \mathbf{p}_t \mathbf{x} \leq 1\}$ is co-convex, i.e. it satisfies the four properties in Definition 3.

Now, consider a co-convex hull H'_t such that $H'_t \neq \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid \mathbf{p}_t \mathbf{x} \leq 1\}$ for any $\mathbf{p}_t \in P_t$. To obtain Lemma 3 it suffices to prove that H'_t is not a minimal co-convex hull. We obtain this conclusion if $H_t \subseteq H'_t$ (and $H_t \neq H'_t$ by construction) for $H_t = \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid \mathbf{p}_t \mathbf{x} \leq 1\}$ with $\mathbf{p}_t \in P_t$.

To show this last point, we first note that, because H'_t is a co-convex hull of the observation (B_t, \mathbf{x}_t) , there exists a hyperplane that separates B_t and the complement of H'_t at \mathbf{x}_t . Then, because this separating hyperplane supports B_t at \mathbf{x}_t , it corresponds to a set $\{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid \mathbf{p}_t \mathbf{x} = 1\}$ for some $\mathbf{p}_t \in P_t$. For this \mathbf{p}_t , we have $H'_t \supseteq \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid \mathbf{p}_t \mathbf{x} \leq 1\}$, which gives the wanted result.

Proof of Lemma 4

The argument is a fairly straightforward generalization of the one leading up to Lemma 3. For compactness, we do not include it here. A proof is available from the authors upon request.

