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Substitution between Fixed-line and Mobile Access: the Role of Complementarities*

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Abstract

We study substitution from fixed-line to mobile voice access, and the role of various complementarities that may influence this process. We use rich survey data on 160,363 households from 27 EU countries during 2005-2012. We estimate a discrete choice model where households may choose one or both technologies, possibly in combination with internet access. We obtain the following main findings. First, there is significant fixed-to mobile substitution, especially in recent years: without mobile telephony, fixed-line penetration would have been 14% higher in 2012. But there is substantial heterogeneity across households and EU regions, with a stronger substitution in Central and Eastern European countries. Second, the decline in fixed telephony has been slowed down because of a significant complementarity between fixed-line and mobile connections offered by the fixed-line incumbent operator. This gives the incumbent a possibility to maintain to some extent its position in the fixed-line market, and to leverage it into the mobile market. Third, the decline in fixed telephony has been slowed down because of the complementarity with broadband internet: the introduction of DSL avoided an additional decline in fixed-line penetration of almost 9% in 2012. The emergence of fixed broadband has thus been the main source through which incumbents maintain their strong position in the fixed-line network.

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1 Introduction

At the start of the 1990s, telecommunications industries in the European Union were controlled by state monopolies which transmitted phone calls using the fixed-line copper network. There was a small number of mobile phone users via analog networks (1G), which in most of the EU countries were operated by the subsidiaries of the fixed-line incumbents. This situation changed dramatically during the last two decades. First, in the early 1990s several competing mobile operators started to deploy voice services based on second generation (2G) technologies GSM-900 and DCS-1800. Second, after the liberalization in the EU in 1998 a large number of entrants started providing voice services through the incumbents' fixed infrastructure. Third, in the late 1990s the deployment of internet broadband services started, which initially also mainly relied on fixed-line copper networks.

With the deployment of these new technologies the number of communication options increased. This influenced the way in which people communicate, in particular how they use copper-based fixed-line connections. The rapid increase in the number of mobile users was paralleled with a decline in the number of fixed-line subscribers. At the same time, the effect of broadband deployment on the usage of fixed-line connections is less obvious. Broadband internet access was first deployed using digital subscriber line technology (DSL). This relied on copper-based networks and required consumers to maintain their fixed-line connections. In most of the EU countries, DSL is still a dominant broadband technology. But there are also countries, especially in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), where alternative broadband technologies, such as cable, fibre and mobile broadband, obtained significant market shares.

In this paper we analyze the substitution between fixed-line and mobile voice services, and the role of several complementarities that may influence this process. In particular, we ask whether and how the incumbent fixed-line operators managed to slow down fixed-to-mobile substitution, and whether they could leverage their position from fixed to the mobile voice services. Furthermore, we ask to which extent broadband internet slowed down fixed-to-mobile substitution. Addressing these questions is important since fixed-to-mobile substitution affects

the financial viability of the incumbent fixed-line operators. It is therefore critical for both the operators and industry regulators to understand the interdependencies between different communication technologies. The question of fixed-to-mobile substitution is also important because of the ongoing consolidation process in telecommunications markets. There is a growing number of mergers between mobile operators which need to be scrutinized by the competition authorities, and substitution between fixed-line and mobile services should play an important role in the market investigations.

To address these questions, we make use of a unique micro-level dataset of 160,363 households from 27 EU countries during the period 2005-2011. We adapt the model of Gentzkow (2007) to analyze the situation in which households may choose bundles of different technologies: fixed voice or mobile voice only, or the combination of both services, with or without broadband internet. We can summarize our results in three main findings.

Our first main finding is that households tend to perceive mobile and fixed-line connections as substitutes, and more strongly so in the recent years. In 2006 total fixed-line penetration in the EU was almost 67%, and it would have been 6% points higher if mobile voice had not been present. In 2012 total fixed-line presentation was about 63%, and it would have been almost 14% points higher without mobile voice access. At the same time, there is substantial heterogeneity across households and regions. In regions with a higher GDP per capita mobile and fixed-line services tend to be stronger substitutes. After controlling for GDP per capita, there is also a stronger degree of substitution in the CEE countries, as compared to the WE countries. There is not only heterogeneity in fixed-to-mobile substitution across regions, but also across households with different age, education, professional activity, etc. This implies that even within a region, some households may perceive fixed-line and mobile connections as very strong substitutes, whereas other households perceive them as essentially independent. Our finding of strong heterogeneity in the perceived substitutability between fixed-line and mobile voice services provides an explanation for the mixed results found in the previous literature that uses aggregate data.¹

¹For instance, Gruber and Verboven (2001) estimate a logistic diffusion model for mobile subscriptions in the

Our second main finding relates to the role of the incumbents, i.e., the previous fixed-line monopolists, in slowing down the extent of fixed-to-mobile substitution. To investigate this, we extended the model based on our data for the years 2006 and 2007. For these years, we observe whether households have fixed and/or mobile voice at the incumbent or at a competitor. This enables us to consider the simultaneous choice of fixed and mobile voice, at the incumbent or a competitor. We confirm the presence of fixed-to-mobile substitution in this model. Furthermore, we find that the decline in fixed-line penetration has been slowed down because of various complementarities: bundled contracts and especially incumbency advantages when fixed-line incumbents are also active in mobile telephony. These incumbency advantage increased the incumbent's market share by about 2.5% points in fixed telephony and by up to 5% points in mobile telephony. Incumbents could thus not only slow down the fixed-to-mobile substitution process, but also leverage their strong position in fixed telephony into the mobile telephony market. These complementarities did not hurt, but actually benefit total fixed and mobile penetration.

Our third main finding relates to the impact of broadband internet on fixed-to-mobile substitution. To assess this, we further extended the model to consider the simultaneous choice of fixed versus mobile voice services and the choice of broadband technology (no broadband, dial-up, DSL, cable, mobile broadband and other). Also in this model specification we confirm the presence of significant fixed-to-mobile substitution, especially in the recent years. In addition, we find that the introduction of mobile broadband slightly strengthens this substitution. But more importantly, broadband internet (mainly DSL) has been a strong source of complementarity with fixed-line telephony. Hence, the decline of fixed telephony has been slowed down because of

EU and find that the penetration rate of fixed telephony has a negative influence on the diffusion of mobiles. On the other hand, Gruber (2001) uses a similar approach for the Central and Eastern European countries and suggests that mobile and fixed-line services may be complements. In another paper, Hamilton (2003) uses data for African countries finds that mobile and fixed-line subscriptions may be both complements and substitutes at different stages of market development. In the early stage of diffusion, mobile services may complement fixed-line telephones but the substitution effect takes over once mobile usage becomes more widespread.

the complementarity between the fixed network and broadband internet. In particular, without DSL fixed-line voice penetration would have been about 6% lower in 2007, and almost 9% points lower in 2012. Most of these complementarities arise from bundling fixed-line and broadband in a single contract (enabling price discounts and convenience). These findings show that the fixed-line incumbent has not only been able to leverage its advantage to mobile voice services, but more importantly also to broadband.

There is a growing body of literature on substitution between fixed-line and mobile services, as reviewed in the next section. However, none of this work systematically analyzes this substitution with detailed household-level data to account for heterogeneity in substitution across households and regions. Furthermore, no work has investigated how complementarities have slowed down fixed-to-mobile substitution, through incumbency advantages and synergies with fixed broadband.

The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature. Section 3 discusses the data used in the estimation. Section 4 introduces the econometric framework. Section 5 presents the estimation results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.

2 Literature Review

There is a growing body of literature on substitution between fixed-line and mobile services, which was recently reviewed in Vogelsang (2010). Most of these studies use cross-country or country-level aggregate data and find substitution between fixed-line and mobile telecommunications services (see Gruber and Verboven (2001), Ward and Zheng (2012), Grzybowski (2013)).

A number of other studies relies on consumer-level data. Rodini et al. (2003) estimate the substitutability between fixed-line and mobile access using data on U.S. households and binary logit model. They find that second fixed line and mobile services are substitutes for one another. In another paper, Ward and Woroch (2010) use quarterly survey panel data in the U.S. for years 1999-2001 and a difference-in-difference analysis to estimate own- and cross-price elasticities of demand for fixed and mobile services, and they find moderate substitution between these two.

García-Marinoso and Suarez (2013) use Spanish household panel data for the years 2004-2009 to analyze substitution from fixed to mobile services. They find that apart from household characteristics also the availability of internet and mobile services plays a role, while prices and expenditures have no, or a small, impact on the substitution decision.

Among papers which focus on internet access, Cardona et al. (2009) use household survey data for Austria to estimate discrete choice models and find that cable modem and mobile access are close substitutes to DSL and that they are in the same market as DSL. Srinuan et al. (2012) use discrete choice model on survey data for Sweden and find that mobile broadband and fixed broadband technologies are close substitutes when they are locally available. Grzybowski et al (2013) estimate a mixed logit model using survey data for Slovakia and find that mobile broadband should be included in the relevant market for internet access based on fixed broadband technologies. However, none of these studies relate internet access to the demand of fixed or mobile connections in voice services.

The studies mentioned above which use discrete choice framework essentially assume some degree of substitution between telecommunications technologies. There are only two recent studies, Liu et al. (2010) and Macher et al. (2011), which explicitly model the possibility of substitution or complementarity between telecommunications technologies in a discrete choice framework. In the first paper, Liu et al. (2010) use a panel survey data of U.S. households for years 2004-2006 to estimate a discrete choice model for broadband services. Their model allows also for parallel choices of related services such as cable TV and local phone and for state-dependence in provider choices. They find evidence of strong complementarities between the consumption of broadband, cable TV and local phone services, where the main source of complementarities are the benefits derived by consumers from having a single provider for multiple services. In the second paper, Macher et al. (2012) estimate a consumer choice model using U.S. household data for years 2003-2010 to analyze whether fixed-line and mobile connections are substitutes or complements based on the model developed by Gentzkow (2007). They adapt the model to a situation in which households choose between having either mobile or fixed-line

access and in addition allow for the use of both technologies at the same time. They find that connections to mobile and fixed-line telephony are substitutes rather than complements.

Since we also follow Gentzkow (2007), our base model is similar to Macher et al. (2012). But in addition we also consider heterogeneity in substitution across households and across the many regions within the set of 27 EU countries. This allow us to conclude whether fixed-line and mobile connections are substitutes, complements or independent from each other in a particular country. We then comment on the hypothesis that consumers across the EU differ in the perception of fixed-line and mobile services and to what extent this is driven by population characteristics. We also analyze whether there is any incumbency advantage in offering to consumers both fixed-line and mobile services and to what extent the use of internet technologies influences substitution or complementarity between mobile and fixed-line connections.

3 Data

Survey data We use five Special Eurobarometer surveys conducted in 27 EU countries by the TNS Opinion & Social Network on behalf of the European Commission. The surveys were conducted in approximately 12 months intervals between December 2005 and December 2012, with the exception of the years 2008 and 2010.² The purpose of the surveys is to follow trends in electronic communications markets and to assess how EU households and citizens derive benefits from increasingly competitive and innovative digital environment.³ A description of the

²There are two 2011 surveys. The first one was conducted in February-March 2011 and the second one was conducted in December 2011. The results of the first survey should not be much different if it was conducted at the end of 2010 instead. We consider therefore that it is equivalent to 2010 survey for consistency with other surveys which were conducted at the end of each year.

³The surveys used in the analysis are: (i) Eurobarometer 64.4: Mental Well-Being, Telecommunications, Harmful internet Content, and Farm Animal Welfare, December 2005 - January 2006; (ii) Eurobarometer 66.3: Social Reality, E-Communications, Common Agricultural Policy, Discrimination and the Media, and Medical Research, November - December 2006; (iii) Eurobarometer 68.2: European Union Policy and Decision Making, Corruption, Civil Justice, E-Communications, Agriculture, and Environmental Protection, November - December 2007; (iv) Eurobarometer 72.5: E-Communications, Agriculture, Geographical and Labor Market Mobility, and

sampling methodology and summary of the results for questions related to telecommunications services can be found in the Eurobarometer reports published on the website of the Commission. The Commission is granting access to Eurobarometer primary data for re-use in social science research and training. We have processed and combined these five surveys and selected variables which are relevant for our questions of interest. Table 1 provides a list of variables which we use in the estimation. Table A.1 in the Appendix shows the number of observations for each country used in the analysis. Tables A.2, A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix illustrate trends in the data with respect to usage of fixed-line and mobile connections.

Prices Data on prices of mobile and fixed-line telecommunications services comes from the reports on “Telecoms Price Developments” produced on annual basis by consultancy firm Teligen on behalf of the European Commission’s Directorate General for Information Society. The objective of these reports is to analyze price developments in the Member States of the European Union in years 1998-2010. The reports show prices as of 1st August each year from 1998 to 2004, as of 1st September from 2005 to 2007, and as of 15th September from 2008 to 2010. Teligen collected tariff data directly from the telecoms operators, from their websites and price-lists. Tariffs data were validated by the NRAs to ensure the reliability of information.⁴ We miss Eurobarometer data for year 2008 because the survey was not conducted in this year. There is no pricing data available for 2011, for which we have the last wave of the survey. We therefore assume that prices were the same in 2010 and 2011.

Prices used in this study are so called “composite baskets”, which are constructed by calcu-
Knowledge of Antibiotic Use, November-December 2009; (v) Eurobarometer 75.1: Energy in the European Union, Citizens’ Rights, E-Communications, the Internal Market, and Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage, February 2011 - March 2011; (vi) Special Eurobarometer 381: E-communications Household Survey, December 2011.

⁴We have combined Teligen’s pricing data with Eurobarometer data. Teligen data for years 2005-2010 was collected in September, which is a few months earlier than the Eurobarometer data, which was usually collected at the end of the year. We assume that Eurobarometer data with fieldwork in: December 2005 – January 2006 relates to 2005 Teligen data; November-December 2006 relates to 2006; November 2007 – January 2008 relates to 2007; November-December 2009 relates to 2009 and February-March 2011 relates to 2010.

lating the cost of a fixed number of different calls per annum, including annual rental charge as well as installation charge depreciated over five years. The number and distribution of calls are kept constant throughout the whole period. For fixed-line services, Teligen provides only baskets for the incumbent operator in each country. Mobile baskets are provided for representative tariffs from two network operators with the greatest number of subscribers.⁵ There is no pricing information available for broadband services. We explain in more detail which prices are used in the estimation when introducing the models.

4 Econometric Model

We aim to model the households' decisions whether to use fixed-line and/or voice mobile telephone services, and in an extension the role played by their internet technology decisions. A standard discrete choice framework is not suitable for such analysis because households may simultaneously choose more than one alternative: (i) they may use both fixed and mobile voice services, and (ii) these services can be combined with the use of a certain internet technology. To incorporate the possibility that households may choose multiple options, we follow the approach of Gentzkow (2007) and formulate a discrete choice model for *bundles* of alternatives.

We first present the base model, where households choose only between voice services (section 4.1), and then extend the model to incorporate the simultaneous choice of internet technology (section 4.2).

4.1 Demand for voice services

Base model A household i has available two possible voice services, indexed by j : fixed-line ($j = F$) and mobile ($j = M$). The choice set consists of the four possible bundles of these services, $r \in \{0, F, M, F + M\}$, where $r = 0$ refers to the choice of no telephone at all, and $r = F + M$ refers to the choice of both fixed and mobile services. Figure 1 shows the shares of

⁵The definitions of the fixed-line and mobile 'composite baskets' are explained in detail in Teligen's reports, which are publicly available on the website of the European Commission.

these four choice alternatives for each of the 27 EU countries in March 2011. Table 2 summarizes these shares across all countries, showing that a majority of households in the sample have both a fixed and a mobile voice line, many households either have a fixed or a mobile voice line, while a minority has no voice connection at all.

Household i 's stand-alone utility from a connection to voice service j is:

$$\bar{u}_{ij} = x_i\beta_j + \alpha p_{ij},$$

where p_{ij} is the price paid by individual i for voice service j and x_i is a vector of household characteristics influencing the utility of the voice service. The price p_{ij} refers to the fixed subscription charge plus the usage cost of a representative consumer. Here as the price of fixed-line we use a basket for the incumbent's tariff and as the price of mobile an average of baskets for one tariff from the incumbent and one tariff from the main competitor. The vector of household characteristics x_i consists of three groups of variables: household demographics (such as sex, age, education, household size); employment status (such as student, retired or employment sector); and regional and time information (such country, regional GDP per capita, time effects).

A household's utility for a bundle of voice services $r \in \{0, F, M, F + M\}$ is:

$$\begin{aligned} u_{ir} &= \varepsilon_{ir} && \text{if } r = 0 \\ u_{ir} &= \sum_{j \in r} \bar{u}_{ij} + \Gamma_{ir} + \varepsilon_{ir}, && \text{if } r \neq 0 \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

where $j \in r$ denotes the set of goods j included in bundle r . The term Γ_{ir} is the difference between the household's total utility for the bundle r and the sum of the stand-alone utilities \bar{u}_{ij} for the services $j \in r$. For the singleton bundles, $r = F$ and $r = M$, we set $\Gamma_{ir} = 0$. For the real bundle $r = F + M$, the services are complements if $\Gamma_{ir} > 0$, they are substitutes if $\Gamma_{ir} < 0$, and they are independent if $\Gamma_{ir} = 0$. Gentzkow (2007) provides a discussion how price affects the marginal consumers in these three situations. Macher et al. (2012) adapt the model to the choice of telecommunications, but in a more restricted setting than ours. We specify $\Gamma_{ir} = x_i\gamma$, which allows for household heterogeneity in their valuation of the substitutability or complementarity of fixed and mobile services. The heterogeneity depends on the same household characteristics

that affect the stand-alone utilities for fixed and mobile voice (demographics, employment status and regional and time information). The terms ε_{ir} are i.i.d. type I extreme value, or the typical “logit” error terms.

Based on this specification, we obtain the following utilities for the four bundles

$$\begin{aligned} u_{i0} &= \varepsilon_{i0} \\ u_{iF} &= x_i\beta_F + \alpha p_{iF} + \varepsilon_{iF} \\ u_{iM} &= x_i\beta_M + \alpha p_{iM} + \varepsilon_{iM} \\ u_{iF+M} &= x_i(\beta_F + \beta_M + \gamma) + \alpha(p_{iF} + p_{iM}) + \varepsilon_{iF+M}. \end{aligned}$$

Note that we only observe prices for the unbundled voice services, p_{iF} and p_{iM} , and define the price of a bundled service as $p_{iF+M} = p_{iF} + p_{iM}$. If a household adopts both fixed and mobile from a different operator, this sum is an accurate description of the cost, as long as usage remains unchanged.⁶ If, however, a household has a contract bundle for fixed and mobile voice from the same operator, then the household may pay a lower price because of a discount or receive some other contractual benefits. To account for this “contractual complementarity”, we make use of information in the survey and construct a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household has a contract bundle for fixed and mobile voice from the same operator, and 0 if it adopts fixed and mobile voice from a different operator. Our estimate of the parameter γ may then be viewed as the extent of substitution/complementarity between fixed and mobile net of the contractual complementarity that arises from the fact that a household makes use of a bundled contract.

Incumbent versus competitor We can easily extend this framework to distinguish between the type of operator providing the voice service: incumbent or competitor. The index j now refers to voice service and operator type: incumbent fixed-line ($j = F_1$), competitor fixed-line ($j = F_2$), incumbent mobile ($j = M_1$), competitor mobile ($j = M_2$). The choice set then consists of nine possible bundles $r \in \{0, F_1, F_2, M_1, M_2, F_1 + M_1, F_1 + M_2, F_2 + M_1, F_2 + M_2\}$. The utilities for the stand-alone alternatives j and for the bundles r take the same form as

⁶The usage of fixed-line and mobile telephones may obviously change when both services are used together.

before. Since there is a large number of bundles we will impose restrictions on the number of interaction terms, as explained in the empirical analysis.

The information on the name of operator used by the household is only available for 2005 and 2006, so we limit this analysis to these first two years of the survey (and we match this with price information at the level of the operator). Table 3 shows that most households have a fixed-line connection from the incumbent, and among those households there is roughly an equal number with a mobile connection from the incumbent or from a competitor. The number of households with a fixed-line connection from an entrant is smaller and in some countries fixed-line services are provided just by the incumbent. Also, in three countries, Lithuania, Romania and UK, the incumbent did not receive a mobile licence at all.

In this model, prices of mobile services are approximated by the usage basket for the tariff from the incumbent and main competitor. But since we only have a basket for the incumbent's fixed-line tariff, we assume that incumbent's and competitor's fixed-line prices are the same.

4.2 Demand for voice services and internet technology

We now extend the framework to incorporate the households' choice of internet technology. Each household has available two voice services $j = \{F, M\}$ (as in the base model) and six possible internet technology choices: (i) no internet, (ii) copper-based dial-up, or "narrowband"; (iii) copper-based DSL broadband; (iv) cable modem broadband; (v) mobile broadband; and (vi) other broadband (usually fibre or WiFi). We denote these internet options by $k = 0, 1, \dots, 5$. The households' choice set therefore consists of a maximum of 24 possible bundles of services: the 4 voice bundles $\{0, F, M, F + M\}$ times the 6 internet choices. In practice, however, there are almost no households without a voice service who have an internet connection via any of the 5 technologies, as shown in Table 4. We therefore restrict the choice set to the remaining 19 alternatives and drop from the analysis the small number of households which selected any of these 5 alternatives which are not considered as viable in our analysis. Note that in principle households may choose more than one internet technology. However, as shown in Table 5, the

incidence of multihoming is rare, and we remove these households from the analysis.

A household's stand-alone utility for voice service j is the same as specified earlier in (1). The additional utility from combining fixed and mobile technology, $r = F + M$, is also specified earlier as $\Gamma_{ir} = x_i\gamma$, where: if $\Gamma_{ir} > 0$ fixed and mobile are complements; they are substitutes if $\Gamma_{ir} < 0$; and they are independent if $\Gamma_{ir} = 0$. The stand-alone utility for an internet technology k is not identified because in the sample households always combine internet with at least one voice service. The household's valuation of a specific internet technology k may depend on the type of voice service $j \in \{F, M\}$, reflecting substitution or complementarity between a particular voice services and internet. For example, households may keep a copper fixed-line connection for voice because it may also be used to access internet via dial-up or DSL. Conversely, households may give up their fixed-line connection for voice services when they access internet via a cable modem, a mobile modem or fibre.⁷ To model this, we let $\Delta_{ij,k}$ to represent the additional utility from adopting internet technology k when the household has adopted the voice service $j \in \{F, M\}$. We specify $\Delta_{ij,k} = \delta_{j,k} + x_i\delta_k$. The first term $\delta_{j,k}$ is a fixed effect capturing the valuations for combining the voice service j with the various internet technologies k . The second term are parameter vectors capturing the effects of household characteristics on the valuation of internet connection k . For example, $\Delta_{iF,1}$ is the additional utility from adopting copper-based dial-up ($k = 1$) when the household has a fixed-line. To simplify, assume that δ_k is the same for all internet connections $k > 0$ (except for technology-specific intercepts) and denote this by $\delta_k = \delta_I$ for $k > 0$. Hence, δ_I captures households' valuations for any internet connection.

A household's utility for a voice service $r \in \{0, F, M, F + M\}$ in combination with an internet

⁷Grzybowski (2013) uses the aggregate data from the Eurobarometer reports published by the European Commission to analyze fixed-to-mobile substitution. He reports that the share of 'fixed + mobile' households is positively correlated with percentage of households having internet access and negatively correlated with the share of households having cable modem.

technology k can then be specified as:

$$\begin{aligned}
u_{ir,k} &= \varepsilon_{ir,k} && \text{if } r = 0, k = 0 \\
u_{ir,k} &= \sum_{j \in r} \bar{u}_{ij} + \Gamma_{ir} + \Delta_{ij,k} + \varepsilon_{ir,k} && \text{if } r \neq 0,
\end{aligned}$$

where the terms $\varepsilon_{ir,k}$ are again the logit error terms.

This gives the following utilities

$$\begin{aligned}
u_{i0,0} &= \varepsilon_{i0,0} \\
u_{iF,k} &= x_i (\beta_F + \delta_I) + \delta_{F,k} + \alpha p_{iF} + \varepsilon_{iF,k} \\
u_{iM,k} &= x_i (\beta_M + \delta_I) + \delta_{M,k} + \alpha p_{iM} + \varepsilon_{iM,k} \\
u_{iF+M,k} &= x_i (\beta_F + \beta_M + \gamma + \delta_I) + (\delta_{F,k} + \delta_{M,k}) + \alpha (p_{iF} + p_{iM}) + \varepsilon_{iF+M,k}.
\end{aligned}$$

4.3 Choice Probabilities and Estimation

In the first model households choose the voice bundle r and in the second model households simultaneously choose the voice bundle r and internet technology k that maximizes random utility. We focus here on the second, more general model. Given that the $\varepsilon_{ir,k}$ are type I extreme value distributed, random utility maximization results in the following logit choice probabilities:

$$s_{ir,k} = \frac{\exp(V_{ir,k})}{1 + \sum_k \sum_r \exp(V_{ir,k})} \quad (2)$$

where $V_{ir,k} \equiv u_{ir,k} - \varepsilon_{ir,k}$ is the deterministic component of household i 's utility for voice bundle r and internet technology k .

In both the first model (voice bundles only) and the second model (voice bundles + internet), we take into account the geographic availability of the choice alternatives. First, while mobile voice services are universally available in all EU countries, fixed voice services may not always be available in rural areas, especially in the CEE countries. As a sensitivity check, we also estimated the models on a sub-sample of households living in large towns and cities, where fixed-line connection should be in general available but the results are broadly similar. Hence, we estimate

the final model assuming that fixed-line is available to all households in each country. Second, certain types of broadband internet technologies may not be available in certain geographic areas or even in whole countries. In the second model, we therefore restrict the choice sets to those broadband technologies that are available in the region where the household lives. If there is at least one household which uses a particular broadband technology in a given area, we assume that it is also available to all other households in this area. This assumption still makes the choice set potentially too broad, because the fact that there are households using a particular broadband technology in a given geographic area does not imply that it is available to all other households in this area.

The choice probabilities (with suitably modified summations in the numerator of (2) to account for limited geographic availability of broadband) form the basis of the likelihood function that is taken to the data. Defining $y_{ir,k} = 1$ if household i selects voice bundle r and internet technology k , and $y_{ijk} = 0$ otherwise, the log likelihood function can be written as:

$$\mathcal{L}(\theta) = \sum_i^N \sum_{r,k} y_{ir,k} \log s_{ir,k}(\theta). \quad (3)$$

where θ is the vector of all parameters to be estimated. The maximum likelihood estimator is the value of the parameter vector θ that maximizes (3). The model allows for rich substitution patterns because of a large set of included observed household characteristics. We nevertheless also considered an extension of the model with unobserved household heterogeneity. This involves the typical random coefficients of the mixed logit model as in Train (2003), and suitable restrictions on these random coefficients for the bundled alternatives. We found that the standard deviations of the random coefficients were not significant, so we focus our analysis on the model with observed household heterogeneity.⁸

⁸The mixed logit model is estimated using simulated maximum likelihood, and takes considerable time to converge given the very large number of observations, choice alternatives and included observed household characteristics.

5 Empirical Results

In section 5.1 we present the empirical results for the two models where households only choose between voice services (Tables 6 and 8). Section 5.2 then considers the results from the third model, where households simultaneously choose the voice service and the internet technology, if any (Table 7). In all specifications, we include a rich set of household characteristics. Summary statistics for these household characteristics were shown earlier in Table 1.

5.1 Voice services

Table 6 shows the empirical results for the two models where households only choose between the two voice services. The left part considers the base model, where the choice set is limited to 4 alternatives: $\{0, F, M, F + M\}$, i.e. households may either choose no telephone, fixed, mobile or both. The right part considers the second model with an extended choice set of 9 alternatives, $\{0, F_1, F_2, M_1, M_2, F_1 + M_1, F_1 + M_2, F_2 + M_1, F_2 + M_2\}$. As discussed above, in this model households also decide whether to take fixed or mobile services from the incumbent (fixed-line) operator (subscript 1), or from a competitor (subscript 2).

In both specifications, price has a negative and highly significant effect on utility. In addition to the price parameter, Table 6 reports three columns: the first and second columns give the stand-alone utilities for fixed-line and mobile voice services (β_F and β_M), and the third column shows the substitution or complementarity effects between fixed and mobile (γ). Table 6 only presents the main effects and the interactions with regional variables (regional income per capita and a dummy variable for the group of CEE countries). Table 8 shows the interactions with the household characteristics for the first specification. The estimated household interactions for the second model (and our subsequent third model with simultaneous choice of broadband) are very similar, so we only present them in the Appendix.

We focus most of our discussion on the estimated substitution effects (parameter vector γ), but also briefly comment on the stand-alone effects (β_F and β_M).

Base model According to the left part of Table 6, households who live in richer regions are more likely to have both mobile and fixed-line connections (positive and strongly significant β_F and β_M). Furthermore, households from the CEE countries are more likely to have mobile, but less likely to have fixed-line connections than households from the WE countries (after controlling for regional income and other household characteristics). Finally, the adoption of mobile phones is still increasing over time (during 2006-2011), whereas the adoption of fixed-line services shows limited variation across years.

Our main interest is in the parameter vector γ , which measures the extent of substitution (or potentially complementarity) between fixed and mobile voice. Notice first that the intercept in γ is negative and highly significant. This estimate implies that households on average tend to view fixed-line and mobile voice as substitutes. Furthermore, the extent of substitution became considerably stronger in the more recent years 2009-2012, compared with the early years of our study 2006-2008. To assess this further, we computed the average “fixed-to-mobile” diversion ratio implied by our estimates. This ratio is the reduction in fixed-line households relative to the increase in mobile households after a price drop for mobile voice services.⁹ The average fixed-to-mobile diversion ratio was 9.0% during 2006-2008, and it increased to 15.4% during 2009-2012. This means that, in 2009-2012, a sizeable 15.4% of the (marginal) mobile households would otherwise have chosen fixed-line access.

One can also observe interesting differences in substitution across regions. There is stronger substitution in areas with a high regional income per capita and in the CEE countries (negative and significant effect in γ). The stronger substitution in the CEE countries (after controlling for regional income and differences in household characteristics) may be due to the lower quality of the fixed network than in the WE countries.¹⁰ Furthermore, there is substantial heterogeneity across households in the perceived substitutability between fixed-line and mobile services, as

⁹Formally, this diversion ratio is $(\partial s_{iR,k} / \partial p_{iM}) / (\partial s_{iM,k} / \partial p_{iM})$. We compute this from (2) and the parameter estimates, and average this over households.

¹⁰As mentioned earlier, the model was also estimated for a limited sample of households which live in towns and cities to account for possible lack of availability of fixed-line in rural areas, but the results were broadly similar.

shown in Table 8. For example, households who live in cities, males and highly educated people are more likely to substitute to mobile, while large households and households with many kids are less likely to substitute. Proprietors and travelling professions consider fixed-line and mobile as stronger substitutes, and households with non-working, housekeeping members tend to view fixed-line and mobile as complementary.¹¹

Finally, it is interesting to consider the estimated coefficient for the contract bundle variable. This is significant and positive, which means that consumers benefit from contractual complementarities when they have a single contract for fixed and mobile voice at the same operator. Such complementarities may be present because of price discounts or because of convenience or some other contractual advantages. We discuss this further in the next subsection, where we distinguish between incumbents and competitors.

Incumbent versus competitor The right part of Table 6 shows the empirical results for the second model with the expanded choice set, which makes a distinction between having a fixed-line or mobile connection from the incumbent or a competitor. This model only uses data for years 2006 and 2007, because information about the operator used by the households is only available for these years. The impact of household characteristics is similar to the previous model (shown in Table 8), so we only present these results in the Appendix. Substitution between fixed and mobile is weaker, which is mainly because we consider only years 2006 and 2007.

Our new findings relate to the role of the incumbency status. Not surprisingly, households have a considerably higher valuation for a fixed-line connection at the incumbent fixed-line operator (second column). This simply reflects the fact that the incumbent operator is the

¹¹Table 8 also shows the effects of household characteristics on the stand-alone utilities for fixed-line and mobile voice services (β_F and β_M). City households have a higher valuation for both fixed-line and mobile voice services than households in smaller towns and rural areas. The same is true for married households, for larger households with a small number of kids below age 15, and for more educated households. Males and younger households also have a higher valuation for mobile phones, but they have a lower valuation for a fixed-line connection. There are also significant differences in the stand-alone valuations for mobile and fixed-line across different professional groups.

dominant provider of fixed-line services and owns most of the fixed telephony network, to which competitors need to obtain access. Furthermore, households tend to have a lower valuation for a mobile connection that is offered by the incumbent (first column). This reflects the fact that most European countries have strongly promoted competition in the mobile telephony market through the policy of granting licences to develop mobile networks. Even though the incumbent was typically granted a mobile licence early on, the competitors altogether tend to have greater market share than the incumbent. In three countries, Lithuania, Romania and UK, the incumbent did not receive a mobile licence at all.

Most interestingly, we can now distinguish between two sources of complementarity: contractual complementarity from having a single contract for fixed and mobile at the same operator (as before) and the complementarity between the incumbent's fixed and mobile network (third column). First, the contractual complementarity is still estimated to be positive and highly significant, but it is lower than in the base model. Second, the complementarity between the incumbent's fixed-line and mobile voice services is also highly significant. In this sense, we can conclude that the incumbent fixed-line operators have an intrinsic advantage in the mobile market. They do not only benefit from the possibility of offering bundled contracts (as the entrants can do as well), but they also benefit from additional advantages relative to entrants. The fixed-line incumbents with a dominant position in fixed telephony in almost all of the EU countries thus have the possibility to leverage this position into the mobile telephony market.

To summarize, the results from the base model and its extension establish that fixed-line connections are in decline because of significant substitution from fixed to mobile telephony. But the decline has been slowed down because of various complementarities: bundled contracts and incumbency advantages when fixed-line incumbents are also active in mobile telephony. To quantify the importance of these findings, we performed several policy counterfactuals on the impact of the introduction of mobile voice services.

Counterfactuals: the impact of mobile on the fixed-line and mobile penetrations

Table 9 shows the impact of the mobile telephony on fixed-line and mobile penetration in the EU. For the year 2012 the estimated impact is based on the first model (base model in left part of Table 6). For the year 2007 the estimated impact is based on the second model (extended base model in right part of Table 6), since for this year we observe whether a household has a voice connection from the incumbent or a competitor.

The first row in Table 9 shows the penetration rates of fixed-line, mobile and no voice adoption, as predicted by the model under the status quo in 2007 and 2012.¹² The second row shows the impact of removing mobile voice services, implemented as a prohibitive (or “infinite”) price increase for mobile voice. A comparison of both rows shows the following. In 2007 mobile telephony reduced the fixed-line penetration rate by 6% points (66.9%, versus 72.9% if mobile telephony had not existed). In 2012 the impact was even stronger: mobile telephony reduced fixed-line penetration by 14% points (63.2%, versus 77.2% without mobile telephony). These numbers are consistent with our earlier reported fixed-to-mobile diversion ratios.¹³ While mobile telephony was detrimental for the fixed-line network, it also implied a much larger number of households with voice access. For example, only 2.4% of the households have no telephony in 2012, and this would have been 22.8% if there had not been mobile telephony (mainly in poorer regions).

The third row shows the impact of bundled contracts, implemented by assuming households have no advantage from bundling mobile and fixed-line services in a single contract (as we estimated in Table 6). In 2007 contractual bundling increased the fixed-line network by 0.5% points in 2007 (from 66.4% to 66.9%). In 2012, the impact of bundling increased to a positive 1.3% (from 61.9% to 63.2%), because of the increasing use of bundling practices.

Finally, the fourth row shows the impact of the incumbent’s advantage when it offers both

¹²The predicted penetration rates are very close to the actual penetration rate, indicating a good model fit.

¹³The fixed-to-mobile diversion ratio is 7.7% in 2007 ($=0.729-0.669$)/0.78, and 15.6% in 2012 ($=0.772-0.632$)/0.9. They are of same order of magnitude as reported above, but they are not entirely comparable, because we now consider a prohibitive price increase, the total effect (rather than the average), and for 2007 a different specification.

fixed and mobile telephony, as has been allowed by regulators in most European countries except the UK, Romania and Lithuania. The possibility for the incumbent fixed operators to offer mobile had a positive impact on fixed-line penetration of 1.8% point (from 65.1% to 66.9%). Furthermore, it also increases mobile penetration by 1% point (from 77.0% to 78.0%). We also considered the impact of allowing the fixed incumbents to offer mobile on their market shares. The fixed incumbent obtains an additional 2.5% market share in fixed telephony when regulators allow it to also offer mobile (57.5%-55.0%). And it obtains an additional 4.8% market share in mobile telephony (38.1%-33.3%), as compared to a mobile entrant that would not operate a fixed network. In sum, the fixed-line operators thus benefit from two incumbency advantages when allowed to offer mobile: they protect their fixed-line market share, and can also leverage it in mobile telephony. Furthermore, these incumbency advantages do not hurt, but actually promoted total fixed and mobile penetration.

5.2 Voice services and internet technology

Table 7 shows the empirical results for the third model, which considers the simultaneous choice of voice and internet technology. As discussed in Section 4, there are now 19 choice alternatives: the 4 voice bundles $\{0, F, M, F + M\}$, which may be combined with at most 6 possible internet choices (including no internet). In addition to the stand-alone utilities for voice (β_F and β_M) and substitution/complementarity effects between fixed and mobile (γ), we now also estimate how household characteristics influence internet adoption (δ_I), and the substitution/complementary between fixed and mobile voice and the various internet technologies ($\delta_{j,k}$). The estimates for the stand-alone utilities and substitution effects for voice services (β_F , β_M and γ) are comparable to our base model: mobile and fixed-line voice services are perceived as substitutes, and this is more so in the CEE countries than in the WE countries.

Our new findings relate to the substitution/complementarity effects between voice services and internet ($\delta_{j,k}$). Based on Table 7, this can be summarized as follows. On the one hand, all five broadband technologies are complementary with a mobile voice connection, but the

complementarity is strongest for the mobile broadband technology. On the other hand, DSL and dial-up are the only broadband technologies that show a strong complementarity with a fixed-line connection. Cable and other broadband show only very weak or no complementarity with a fixed-line connection, whereas mobile broadband is in fact a strong substitute for a fixed line connection. This follows from the fact that DSL and dial-up require households to have a copper line connection, so that they can obtain fixed-line voice services at small or no costs. In contrast, mobile broadband does not require a copper line connection, so that they become substitutes.

It is also interesting to note the complementarity that is generated from bundled contracts. As already found in the base model, a contract that bundles fixed and mobile voice generates complementarities (in the form of price discounts or convenience). Furthermore, there is an even stronger complementarity from contracts that bundle fixed voice with broadband internet (dial-up or DSL). There is also some complementarity from bundling mobile voice with internet, but this is weaker, which may be because mobile internet has not yet been up to speed during our sample period.

Note that our model also included interactions of household characteristics with internet access (δ_I). These results are shown in the Appendix, and we briefly review them here. First, households living in the cities and smaller towns are more likely to use internet, as compared to households from rural areas. Males and married households are more likely to have internet access. The same is true for larger households, households with many kids, younger and highly educated households.

To summarize, the results from the third model confirm the presence of significant substitution from fixed to mobile telephony. Furthermore, we find that the decline of fixed telephony has been slowed down because of the complementarity of the fixed network with different broadband technologies and the associated bundled contracts. As in the previous subsection, we now quantify the importance of these findings through several policy counterfactuals. We focus only

on the impact of the introduction of internet.¹⁴

Counterfactuals: the impact of internet on the fixed-line and mobile penetrations

Table 10 shows the impact of internet on fixed-line and mobile voice penetration in the EU. This is based on our third model ‘base model + broadband’ (for which the parameter estimates were reported in Table 7). The first row shows the predicted penetration rates under the status quo. These are close to the numbers in Table 9.

The second row shows the estimated impact of entirely removing internet. A comparison of the first and second row shows the following. Without the introduction of internet, fixed-line voice penetration would have been 7% points lower in 2007 (69.1% – 62.1%), and even 9.9% points lower in 2012 (63.7% – 53.8%). The complementarity with internet has thus been a main driver for slowing down the process of fixed-to-mobile substitution.

The third row of Table 10 shows how much of the broadband internet effect can be attributed to DSL, which is the main broadband technology in the EU requiring copper fixed-line connection.¹⁵ Without the DSL internet technology, fixed-line voice penetration would have been 6.3% points lower in 2007, and 8.8% points lower in 2012. Hence, most of the positive impact of internet on the fixed line network can be attributed to the complementarity with DSL.

Finally, the fourth row shows the impact of the contractual bundling practices on the fixed and mobile telephony networks. If fixed-line and internet were not offered as bundles, then fixed-line penetration would be up to 10% lower. Hence, the positive effect of internet on the fixed line network can be entirely attributed to the bundling practices. This can be in the form of price discounts or convenience from having a single provider for voice and internet.

The discussion so far focused on the large positive impact of internet on the fixed-line network. The impact of internet on the mobile network has also been positive but not surprisingly much smaller in magnitude. For example, without internet, mobile voice penetration would have

¹⁴The counterfactuals for the impact of mobile voice on fixed and mobile voice give similar results as in the two models in the previous section, so we do not report these here.

¹⁵Dial-up internet (or narrowband) also requires the copper fixed-line network, but it is quickly losing popularity. In our counterfactual we remove both DSL and dial-up.

been 3.2% points lower (78.8% – 75.6%).

Tables 9 and 10 report predictions for the EU countries altogether, but there are significant differences across countries in how fixed-line penetration changes in these different scenarios. This is due to differences in substitution between fixed-line and mobile services and differences in penetration of internet technologies.

6 Conclusion

In this paper we use a rich survey data on 160,363 households from 27 EU countries in the years 2005-2012 to analyze substitution between access to fixed-line and mobile telecommunications services, and the role of complementarities that may influence this process. We estimate discrete choice models in which households can choose between access to fixed-line and/or mobile voice services, possibly in combination with broadband.

We consider three model specifications. In the first model specification, households only choose between voice services where the choice set consists of 4 alternatives: no telephone, fixed, mobile or both. In the second specification, households choose between voice services from the fixed-line incumbent operator or from competitors, so that the choice set is extended to 9 alternatives. In the third model specification, households simultaneously choose voice and internet technology. There are 19 choice alternatives in this case: the 4 choices of voice from the first specification, which may be combined with at most 6 internet technology choices (including having no internet).

The results from the first and second model specification show that fixed-line connections are in decline because of significant substitution from fixed to mobile telephony: in 2012 mobile telephony reduced fixed-line penetration by 14% points. The degree of substitution is not homogeneous: it varies between households and it is stronger in regions with a high income per capita and in the CEE countries (which may be due to the lower quality of the fixed network than in the WE countries). We also find that the decline has been slowed down because of various complementarities: bundled contracts and especially incumbency advantages when fixed-line

incumbents are also active in mobile telephony. These incumbency advantages increased the incumbent's market share by about 2.5% points in fixed telephony, and by up to 5% points in mobile telephony. Incumbents could thus not only slow down the fixed-to-mobile substitution process, but also leverage their strong position in fixed telephony into the mobile telephony market. These complementarities did not hurt, but actually benefitted total fixed and mobile penetration.

The results from the third model confirm the presence of significant substitution from fixed to mobile telephony. Furthermore, we find that the decline of fixed telephony has been slowed down because of the complementarity of the fixed network with Internet. In particular, without the introduction of DSL, fixed-line voice penetration would have been almost 9% points lower in 2012. Most of these complementarities arise from the fact that fixed-line and broadband are offered in a bundled contract (enabling price discounts and increased convenience). These findings show that the fixed-line incumbent operator has not only been able to leverage its advantage to mobile voice services, but more importantly also to broadband, since the incumbent typically owns the fixed copper network infrastructure.

Our results suggest that policies towards regulation of broadband market have an impact on the market structure of voice services. We can in general distinguish between two regulatory approaches which result in different market structures of broadband services. One approach is to promote competition on the incumbent's copper network through regulation which provides entrants with access to incumbent's infrastructure via local loop unbundling (service-based competition).¹⁶ Another approach is to promote deployment and competition between different broadband platforms such as cable modem, fibre, WiFi and more recently mobile broadband (infrastructure-based competition). Some countries opted for service-based competition resulting in high market share of DSL connections, while other pursued infrastructure-based competition with a high market share of other broadband technologies. In future work, it would be interesting to perform policy counterfactuals to our model to evaluate the impact of these alternative

¹⁶Local loop unbundling is the regulatory process of allowing multiple telecommunications operators to use connections from the telephone exchange to the customer's premises.

policies on voice and broadband adoption.


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Tables and Figures

Figure 1: Shares of voice technologies across the EU countries



Source: "Eurobarometer: E-Communications Household Surveys", 2011: fieldwork in February-March 2011

Table 1: Summary statistics

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std	Min	Max
Cost of mobile	160,363	10.6	4.9	1.18	29.7
Cost of fixed-line	160,363	36.9	7.9	16.3	57.4
GDP per capita	160,363	22.6	16	2.7	250
Male	160,363	0.45	0.5	0	1
Married	160,363	0.52	0.5	0	1
Age <= 24	160,363	0.12	0.3	0	1
Age > 24 and <= 34	160,363	0.15	0.4	0	1
Age > 34 and <= 44	160,363	0.17	0.4	0	1
Age > 44 and <= 54	160,363	0.17	0.4	0	1
Age > 54 and <= 64	160,363	0.17	0.4	0	1
Age > 64 (base)	160,363	0.22	0.4	0	1
Household size	160,363	2.51	1.1	1	4
Number of kids	160,237	0.16	0.4	0	4
Education years <= 15	160,363	0.2	0.4	0	1
Education years > 15 and < 20	160,363	0.43	0.5	0	1
Education years 20+	160,363	0.27	0.4	0	1
Living in rural area (base)	160,363	0.36	0.5	0	1
Living in town	160,363	0.28	0.4	0	1
Living in city	160,363	0.37	0.5	0	1
Profession: unemployed (base)	160,363	0.08	0.3	0	1
Profession: housekeeping	160,363	0.07	0.3	0	1
Profession: student	160,363	0.08	0.3	0	1
Profession: retired	160,363	0.29	0.5	0	1
Profession: office employee	160,363	0.08	0.3	0	1
Profession: professional	160,363	0.04	0.2	0	1
Profession: manual worker	160,363	0.14	0.3	0	1
Profession: proprietor	160,363	0.04	0.2	0	1
Profession: manager	160,363	0.07	0.3	0	1
Profession: farmer	160,363	0.01	0.1	0	1
Profession: travelling	160,363	0.1	0.3	0	1
Internet access: DSL	160,363	0.26	0.4	0	1
Internet access: cable	160,363	0.12	0.3	0	1
Internet access: dial-up	160,363	0.09	0.3	0	1
Internet access: mobile	160,363	0.03	0.2	0	1
Internet access: other	160,363	0.03	0.2	0	1

Base variable is indicated for dummy variables. In the case of Education years dummies, the reference are households without education or with missing information.

Table 2: Choice of voice technologies

		Fixed-line		
		No	Yes	Total
Mobile	No	5,775	19,567	25,342
	Yes	46,471	88,550	135,021
	Total	52,246	108,117	160,363

Table 3: Choice of voice technologies offered by incumbent and competitor

		Fixed-line			
		None	Incumbent	Competitor	Total
Mobile	None	3,297	8,459	835	12,591
	Incumbent	4,091	10,227	1,423	15,741
	Competitor	8,993	12,995	3,086	25,074
	Total	16,381	31,681	5,344	53,406

Table 4: Choice of voice and broadband technologies

	DSL	Dial-up	Cable modem	Mobile	Other	None	Total
Mobile only	6,210	1,155	7,183	3,019	3,008	26,710	47,285
Fixed-line only	1,325	774	497	50	129	16,861	19,636
Mobile+ Fixed-line	33,470	12,253	11,447	2,259	2,656	29,133	91,218
None	79	26	88	15	29	5,544	5,781
Total	41,084	14,208	19,215	5,343	5,822	78,248	163,920

The total number 163,920 is greater than the number of observations 160,363 because of multi-homing of broadband technologies.

Table 5: Multihoming of broadband technologies

	DSL	Dial-up	Cable modem	Mobile	Other	None	Total
DSL	0	740	307	1,091	134	38,812	41,084
Dial-up		98	141	179	59	12,893	13,370
Cable modem			0	447	80	18,240	18,767
Mobile				0	95	3,531	3,626
Other					186	5,082	5,268
None						78,248	78,248
							160,363

Table 6: Choice model for voice services

	Base model			Base model + Incumbent		
	Mobile	Fixed-line	Mobile+Fixed (γ)	Mobile	Fixed-line	Mobile+Fixed (γ)
Price	-0.038*** (0.001)	-0.038*** (0.001)		-0.042*** (0.001)	-0.042*** (0.001)	
Intercept	-0.643*** (0.103)	2.910*** (0.104)	-0.654*** (0.114)	-1.426*** (0.148)	0.719*** (0.141)	-0.225 (0.166)
CEE dummy	0.164*** (0.027)	-0.620*** (0.034)	-0.411*** (0.038)	-0.168** (0.078)	-1.091*** (0.078)	0.236*** (0.088)
GDP per capita	1.303*** (0.027)	1.104*** (0.029)	-0.710*** (0.031)	0.954*** (0.051)	0.408*** (0.050)	-0.134** (0.057)
Bundle Mobile+Fixed			2.144*** (0.048)			1.437*** (0.072)
Incumbent				-0.516*** (0.017)	1.334*** (0.016)	0.397*** (0.021)
Year dummy: 2007	0.051 (0.047)	-0.408*** (0.047)	0.075 (0.051)	0.104** (0.043)	-0.274*** (0.043)	-0.005 (0.048)
Year dummy: 2008	0.215*** (0.048)	-0.590*** (0.049)	0.160*** (0.053)			
Year dummy: 2009	1.041*** (0.054)	-0.168*** (0.055)	-0.373*** (0.058)			
Year dummy: 2011	1.252*** (0.056)	-0.350*** (0.058)	-0.234*** (0.062)			
Year dummy: 2012	1.274*** (0.055)	-0.380*** (0.058)	-0.282*** (0.061)			
Observations	640,948			405,902		
Households	160,363			53,199		

Base model: choices of voice connections with substitution parameters for two groups of CEE and WE countries. The regressions include household characteristics which are reported in Table 8. Base model + incumbent: choices of voice connections from incumbent vs. competitor. The regression includes household characteristics which are reported in Table A.5.

Standard errors in parentheses, *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table 7: Choice model for voice services and broadband internet

	Base model + Broadband					
	Mobile	Fixed-line	Mobile +Fixed (γ)	Broadband	Broadband +Mobile (δ_M)	Broadband +Fixed (δ_F)
Price	-0.039*** (0.001)	-0.039*** (0.001)				
Intercept	-0.695*** (0.104)	3.069*** (0.105)	-0.437*** (0.115)			
CEE dummy	0.137*** (0.028)	-0.637*** (0.034)	-0.403*** (0.039)			
GDP per capita	1.205*** (0.027)	0.961*** (0.030)	-0.809*** (0.032)	0.823*** (0.010)		
Dial-up connection				-7.946*** (0.078)	1.025*** (0.041)	2.471*** (0.035)
DSL connection				-6.709*** (0.068)	1.509*** (0.032)	1.789*** (0.019)
Cable connection				-6.450*** (0.078)	1.412*** (0.049)	0.552*** (0.020)
Mobile broadband				-7.835*** (0.196)	1.786*** (0.186)	-0.833*** (0.040)
Other broadband				-7.681*** (0.129)	1.343*** (0.113)	0.042 (0.035)
Bundle Mobile + Fixed			1.645*** (0.059)			
Bundle Mobile + Internet	0.543*** (0.102)					
Bundle Fixed + Internet		3.564*** (0.051)				
Year dummy: 2007			0.024 (0.051)	0.140*** (0.022)	0.071 (0.046)	-0.430*** (0.047)
Year dummy: 2008			0.010 (0.053)	0.514*** (0.022)	0.235*** (0.048)	-0.686*** (0.049)
Year dummy: 2009			-0.684*** (0.059)	1.103*** (0.023)	1.052*** (0.054)	-0.421*** (0.055)
Year dummy: 2010			-0.606*** (0.063)	1.478*** (0.023)	1.221*** (0.057)	-0.719*** (0.059)
Year dummy: 2011			-0.303*** (0.061)	1.475*** (0.023)	1.053*** (0.055)	-0.518*** (0.058)
Observations	2,982,316					
Households	160,363					

Base model + Broadband: choices of voice and broadband connections. The regression include household characteristics which are reported in Table A.5.

Standard errors in parentheses, *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table 8: Choice model for voice services: household characteristics effects

	Base model		
	Mobile	Fixed-line	Mobile+Fixed (γ)
Living in city	0.757*** (0.043)	0.635*** (0.045)	-0.499*** (0.047)
Living in town	0.519*** (0.035)	0.258*** (0.036)	-0.337*** (0.038)
Male	-0.373*** (0.032)	-0.570*** (0.034)	0.540*** (0.036)
Married	0.411*** (0.037)	0.341*** (0.039)	-0.175*** (0.041)
Household size	0.126*** (0.021)	0.304*** (0.023)	0.097*** (0.024)
Number of kids	-0.132*** (0.044)	-0.283*** (0.051)	0.157*** (0.053)
Age > 24 and \leq 34	1.966*** (0.093)	-2.270*** (0.121)	0.476*** (0.125)
Age > 34 and \leq 44	2.013*** (0.078)	-2.066*** (0.091)	0.172* (0.095)
Age > 44 and \leq 54	1.550*** (0.073)	-1.539*** (0.080)	0.048 (0.085)
Age > 54 and \leq 64	1.091*** (0.062)	-1.050*** (0.064)	0.022 (0.070)
Age > 64	0.907*** (0.047)	-0.482*** (0.046)	-0.047 (0.052)
Education years 15-	0.353*** (0.071)	0.315*** (0.069)	-0.056 (0.082)
Education years > 15 and \leq 20	1.102*** (0.071)	0.762*** (0.071)	-0.133 (0.082)
Education years 20+	1.686*** (0.085)	1.270*** (0.086)	-0.342*** (0.096)
Profession: housekeeping	-0.072 (0.071)	-0.561*** (0.081)	0.260*** (0.086)
Profession: student	2.086*** (0.136)	1.274*** (0.167)	-0.180 (0.175)
Profession: retired	0.177*** (0.065)	0.044 (0.065)	-0.016 (0.071)
Profession: office employee	1.401*** (0.124)	0.606*** (0.134)	-0.372*** (0.136)
Profession: professional	1.159*** (0.161)	0.197 (0.178)	0.223 (0.182)
Profession: manual worker	0.770*** (0.071)	0.113 (0.077)	-0.299*** (0.081)
Profession: proprietor	1.828*** (0.175)	1.101*** (0.185)	-0.733*** (0.187)
Profession: manager	1.264*** (0.143)	0.692*** (0.151)	-0.405*** (0.154)
Profession: farmer	-0.090 (0.113)	0.326*** (0.118)	0.034 (0.131)
Profession: travelling	1.382*** (0.105)	0.621*** (0.113)	-0.592*** (0.116)
Observations	640,948		
Households	160,363		

Base model: choices of voice connections with substitution parameters for two groups of CEE and WE countries.

Standard errors in parentheses, *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table 9: The impact of mobile on fixed-line and mobile penetrations: predicted penetrations in 2007 and 2012

	2007			2012		
	mobile	fixed-line	none	mobile	fixed-line	none
Current	78.0%	66.9%	6.1%	90.0%	63.2%	2.4%
of which incumbent	38.1%	57.5%				
No mobile	0.0%	72.9%	27.1%	0.0%	77.2%	22.8%
of which incumbent	0.0%	61.6%				
No fixed-mobile bundle	77.7%	66.4%	6.2%	89.7%	61.9%	2.4%
of which incumbent	38.1%	57.0%				
No incumbent's fixed-mobile advantage	77.0%	65.1%	6.3%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
of which incumbent	33.3%	55.0%				

Predicted mobile and fixed-line penetration for: (i) Current: current situation; (ii) No mobiles: no mobile telephones available; (iii) No mobile+fixed bundle: zero value of mobile+fixed bundle; (iv) No incumbent's fixed-mobile advantage: no additional utility from using mobile and fixed-line from incumbent.

Table 10: The impact of broadband on fixed-line: predicted mobile and fixed-line penetration in 2007 and 2012

	2007			2012		
	mobile	fixed-line	none	mobile	fixed-line	none
Current	78.8%	69.1%	4.9%	90.1%	63.7%	2.4%
No broadband	75.6%	62.1%	5.8%	86.6%	53.8%	3.4%
No DSL	77.3%	62.8%	5.3%	88.8%	54.9%	2.9%
No bundle fixed+internet	78.9%	66.6%	5.0%	90.4%	53.7%	2.6%

Predicted mobile and fixed-line penetration for: (i) Current: current situation; (ii) No broadband: no broadband available (iii) No DSL: no DSL broadband available; (iv) No bundle fixed+internet: zero value of fixed+internet bundle.

Appendix

Table A.1: Sample size by country

	2005	2006	2007	2009	2011	2012	Sum
Austria	1,019	1,029	1,012	1,001	1,030	1,047	6,138
Belgium	1,011	1,009	1,004	1,003	1,025	1,033	6,085
Bulgaria	1,002	1,023	1,000	1,007	1,001	1,001	6,034
Cyprus	507	504	505	502	500	503	3,021
Czech Republic	1,012	1,150	1,169	1,096	1,014	995	6,436
Germany	1,515	1,504	1,519	1,522	1,622	1,562	9,244
Denmark	1,039	1,037	1,000	1,008	1,013	1,011	6,108
Estonia	1,000	1,000	1,002	1,000	1,003	1,000	6,005
Greece	999	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	999	5,998
Spain	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,023	1,004	1,010	6,037
Finland	1,023	1,028	1,038	1,041	1,001	1,002	6,133
France	1,031	1,012	1,024	1,005	1,035	1,051	6,158
Hungary	1,010	1,000	1,000	1,017	1,029	1,012	6,068
Ireland	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,014	1,007	1,014	6,035
Italy	1,011	1,038	1,039	1,039	1,027	1,011	6,165
Lithuania	1,022	1,025	1,018	1,027	1,029	1,025	6,146
Luxembourg	500	502	500	502	503	507	3,014
Latvia	1,046	1,019	1,009	1,004	1,014	1,021	6,113
Malta	500	500	500	500	500	500	3,000
Netherlands	1,127	1,020	1,000	1,004	1,012	1,008	6,171
Poland	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	6,000
Portugal	1,004	1,004	1,000	1,038	1,010	1,005	6,061
Romania	1,003	1,000	1,000	1,008	1,053	1,034	6,098
Sweden	1,009	1,014	1,015	1,014	1,024	1,023	6,099
Slovenia	1,028	1,019	1,016	1,017	1,018	1,014	6,112
Slovakia	1,015	1,003	1,055	1,047	1,040	999	6,159
United Kingdom	1,310	1,315	1,305	1,322	1,322	1,306	7,880
Sum	26,743	26,755	26,730	26,761	26,836	26,693	160,518

Table A.2: Households with fixed-line access by country (%)

Country	2005	2006	2007	2009	2011	2012
Austria	0.69	0.58	0.58	0.50	0.48	0.47
Belgium	0.77	0.69	0.68	0.67	0.70	0.71
Bulgaria	0.68	0.70	0.65	0.62	0.51	0.53
Cyprus	0.91	0.88	0.89	0.84	0.85	0.77
Czech Republic	0.54	0.44	0.35	0.24	0.17	0.19
Germany	0.88	0.89	0.87	0.89	0.88	0.88
Denmark	0.86	0.84	0.80	0.73	0.68	0.66
Estonia	0.63	0.52	0.60	0.54	0.51	0.52
Greece	0.87	0.83	0.83	0.80	0.84	0.83
Spain	0.77	0.76	0.73	0.70	0.72	0.71
Finland	0.57	0.51	0.44	0.33	0.26	0.24
France	0.86	0.80	0.85	0.90	0.89	0.90
Hungary	0.68	0.48	0.45	0.54	0.49	0.49
Ireland	0.83	0.76	0.82	0.73	0.69	0.69
Italy	0.68	0.53	0.58	0.69	0.66	0.69
Lithuania	0.44	0.39	0.38	0.42	0.36	0.35
Luxembourg	0.96	0.95	0.97	0.93	0.93	0.91
Latvia	0.56	0.47	0.52	0.48	0.49	0.39
Malta	0.98	0.97	0.96	0.98	0.98	0.96
Netherlands	0.97	0.94	0.93	0.91	0.91	0.88
Poland	0.71	0.69	0.65	0.55	0.49	0.46
Portugal	0.56	0.63	0.43	0.54	0.61	0.62
Romania	0.53	0.42	0.47	0.45	0.42	0.45
Sweden	1.00	0.98	0.98	0.99	0.98	0.99
Slovenia	0.87	0.87	0.84	0.83	0.84	0.78
Slovakia	0.59	0.53	0.49	0.41	0.38	0.32
United Kingdom	0.90	0.88	0.87	0.82	0.87	0.86

Table A.3: Households with mobile access by country (%)

Country	2005	2006	2007	2009	2011	2012
Austria	0.80	0.82	0.89	0.90	0.92	0.93
Belgium	0.81	0.85	0.85	0.88	0.91	0.89
Bulgaria	0.47	0.53	0.62	0.77	0.82	0.78
Cyprus	0.76	0.72	0.83	0.90	0.93	0.96
Czech Republic	0.88	0.90	0.93	0.94	0.96	0.96
Germany	0.75	0.78	0.81	0.80	0.85	0.87
Denmark	0.85	0.85	0.91	0.92	0.95	0.95
Estonia	0.75	0.82	0.85	0.90	0.93	0.92
Greece	0.68	0.70	0.75	0.81	0.90	0.91
Spain	0.74	0.76	0.76	0.86	0.87	0.87
Finland	0.92	0.91	0.93	0.94	0.96	0.95
France	0.75	0.75	0.77	0.82	0.85	0.88
Hungary	0.68	0.68	0.75	0.80	0.86	0.85
Ireland	0.82	0.86	0.89	0.92	0.94	0.94
Italy	0.89	0.89	0.92	0.95	0.93	0.94
Lithuania	0.70	0.77	0.82	0.90	0.93	0.93
Luxembourg	0.86	0.88	0.91	0.90	0.95	0.95
Latvia	0.72	0.79	0.86	0.91	0.95	0.95
Malta	0.73	0.80	0.79	0.85	0.89	0.82
Netherlands	0.88	0.90	0.91	0.94	0.95	0.94
Poland	0.59	0.65	0.72	0.78	0.84	0.82
Portugal	0.64	0.77	0.77	0.81	0.84	0.85
Romania	0.50	0.62	0.66	0.74	0.85	0.81
Sweden	0.95	0.92	0.93	0.93	0.95	0.94
Slovenia	0.87	0.82	0.85	0.91	0.91	0.92
Slovakia	0.73	0.80	0.83	0.91	0.91	0.92
United Kingdom	0.80	0.81	0.85	0.85	0.90	0.88

Table A.4: Households with fixed-line and mobile access by country (%)

Country	2005	2006	2007	2009	2011	2012
Austria	0.51	0.43	0.49	0.41	0.41	0.40
Belgium	0.60	0.57	0.56	0.56	0.62	0.62
Bulgaria	0.33	0.37	0.44	0.47	0.41	0.39
Cyprus	0.68	0.60	0.72	0.74	0.78	0.73
Czech Republic	0.45	0.37	0.31	0.21	0.16	0.18
Germany	0.65	0.68	0.69	0.70	0.74	0.76
Denmark	0.71	0.71	0.72	0.65	0.63	0.61
Estonia	0.44	0.39	0.49	0.47	0.46	0.46
Greece	0.57	0.55	0.59	0.62	0.74	0.74
Spain	0.54	0.56	0.54	0.59	0.60	0.60
Finland	0.49	0.43	0.37	0.28	0.23	0.19
France	0.62	0.58	0.64	0.73	0.74	0.78
Hungary	0.43	0.30	0.31	0.39	0.41	0.40
Ireland	0.67	0.65	0.72	0.66	0.64	0.64
Italy	0.58	0.47	0.52	0.65	0.61	0.65
Lithuania	0.26	0.29	0.29	0.36	0.31	0.30
Luxembourg	0.82	0.83	0.87	0.83	0.88	0.86
Latvia	0.37	0.36	0.42	0.42	0.46	0.37
Malta	0.72	0.77	0.76	0.83	0.87	0.79
Netherlands	0.85	0.84	0.84	0.85	0.87	0.83
Poland	0.41	0.42	0.43	0.39	0.38	0.34
Portugal	0.33	0.46	0.33	0.42	0.51	0.51
Romania	0.28	0.28	0.32	0.33	0.35	0.36
Sweden	0.95	0.91	0.92	0.92	0.93	0.92
Slovenia	0.75	0.70	0.72	0.75	0.76	0.70
Slovakia	0.40	0.39	0.37	0.35	0.31	0.27
United Kingdom	0.71	0.71	0.73	0.68	0.78	0.75

Table A.5: Estimates of household characteristics

	Base model + Incumbent			Base model + Broadband			
	Mobile	Fixed-line	Mobile+Fixed (γ)	Mobile	Fixed-line	Mobile+Fixed (γ)	Broadband
Living in city	0.749*** (0.059)	0.549*** (0.059)	-0.479*** (0.065)	0.749*** (0.043)	0.603*** (0.045)	-0.543*** (0.047)	0.243*** (0.017)
Living in town	0.495*** (0.049)	0.252*** (0.049)	-0.334*** (0.055)	0.517*** (0.035)	0.219*** (0.036)	-0.378*** (0.039)	0.185*** (0.015)
Male	-0.160*** (0.046)	-0.410*** (0.046)	0.457*** (0.051)	-0.386*** (0.032)	-0.590*** (0.034)	0.498*** (0.036)	0.235*** (0.014)
Married	0.328*** (0.052)	0.258*** (0.052)	-0.049 (0.058)	0.406*** (0.037)	0.336*** (0.039)	-0.197*** (0.041)	0.179*** (0.016)
Household size	0.072** (0.029)	0.346*** (0.031)	0.082** (0.033)	0.087*** (0.021)	0.243*** (0.023)	0.068*** (0.024)	0.296*** (0.008)
Number of kids	-0.127** (0.060)	-0.269*** (0.066)	0.129* (0.070)	-0.145*** (0.044)	-0.296*** (0.052)	0.159*** (0.053)	0.031* (0.016)
Age > 24 and \leq 34	2.652*** (0.137)	-2.043*** (0.170)	0.210 (0.181)	1.877*** (0.094)	-2.485*** (0.121)	0.228* (0.126)	1.326*** (0.039)
Age > 34 and \leq 44	2.490*** (0.111)	-1.729*** (0.123)	-0.031 (0.135)	1.933*** (0.078)	-2.291*** (0.092)	-0.068 (0.096)	1.271*** (0.032)
Age > 44 and \leq 54	1.868*** (0.105)	-1.264*** (0.108)	-0.086 (0.121)	1.472*** (0.073)	-1.749*** (0.080)	-0.179** (0.085)	1.244*** (0.031)
Age > 54 and \leq 64	1.407*** (0.089)	-0.732*** (0.087)	-0.195* (0.102)	1.053*** (0.062)	-1.193*** (0.064)	-0.212*** (0.070)	1.133*** (0.029)
Age > 64	1.025*** (0.069)	-0.326*** (0.062)	-0.059 (0.078)	0.894*** (0.047)	-0.564*** (0.046)	-0.203*** (0.052)	0.787*** (0.024)
Education years 15-	0.663*** (0.110)	0.507*** (0.095)	-0.425*** (0.128)	0.386*** (0.072)	0.332*** (0.069)	0.006 (0.083)	-0.489*** (0.048)
Education years > 15 and \leq 20	1.333*** (0.110)	0.988*** (0.098)	-0.524*** (0.129)	1.091*** (0.072)	0.685*** (0.071)	-0.202** (0.083)	0.326*** (0.046)
Education years 20+	1.634*** (0.124)	1.377*** (0.113)	-0.546*** (0.142)	1.531*** (0.086)	1.022*** (0.086)	-0.441*** (0.097)	1.038*** (0.047)
Profession: housekeeping	-0.073 (0.102)	-0.488*** (0.110)	0.076 (0.123)	-0.072 (0.071)	-0.578*** (0.081)	0.258*** (0.086)	-0.032 (0.033)
Profession: student	1.802*** (0.189)	1.338*** (0.222)	-0.362 (0.243)	1.687*** (0.137)	0.781*** (0.169)	-0.174 (0.176)	1.491*** (0.059)
Profession: retired	0.212** (0.092)	0.052 (0.086)	-0.148 (0.101)	0.161** (0.065)	0.018 (0.065)	-0.006 (0.071)	0.050* (0.030)
Profession: office employee	1.225*** (0.163)	0.607*** (0.174)	-0.253 (0.181)	1.227*** (0.125)	0.387*** (0.135)	-0.370*** (0.138)	0.616*** (0.032)
Profession: professional	1.199*** (0.210)	0.257 (0.230)	0.174 (0.238)	0.847*** (0.163)	-0.193 (0.180)	0.270 (0.183)	1.027*** (0.043)
Profession: manual worker	0.619*** (0.097)	0.035 (0.102)	-0.260** (0.111)	0.744*** (0.071)	0.067 (0.077)	-0.304*** (0.081)	0.121*** (0.029)
Profession: proprietor	1.387*** (0.209)	0.898*** (0.219)	-0.493** (0.227)	1.664*** (0.176)	0.906*** (0.185)	-0.742*** (0.188)	0.617*** (0.038)
Profession: manager	1.035*** (0.177)	0.490*** (0.187)	-0.105 (0.195)	0.894*** (0.145)	0.279* (0.153)	-0.292* (0.155)	0.982*** (0.036)
Profession: farmer	-0.395** (0.173)	0.196 (0.161)	0.164 (0.199)	-0.072 (0.113)	0.393*** (0.118)	0.110 (0.131)	-0.360*** (0.062)
Profession: travelling	1.167*** (0.139)	0.550*** (0.147)	-0.470*** (0.154)	1.242*** (0.106)	0.453*** (0.114)	-0.597*** (0.116)	0.521*** (0.030)
Observations	405,902			2,982,316			
Households	53,199			160,363			

(i) Base model + Incumbent: choices of voice connections from incumbent vs. competitor; (ii) Base model + Broadband: choices of voice and broadband connections.
Standard errors in parentheses, *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

